# Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

PFMEA for Suppliers



## **Process Failure Modes and Effects Analysis**



A structured approach that ensures potential process failure modes and their associated causes have been considered and addressed in the design of the process

- What can go wrong?
- Where will the variation come from?
- How can we prevent or control?



#### **Overview of the PFMEA Process**



- People knowledgeable about the process analyze situations where critical customer requirements might not be met
- A ranking system is used to estimate three factors:
  - how **S**evere the failure would be
  - how frequently the failure would **O**ccur,
  - how difficult it would be to <u>D</u>etect, and
- The S/O/D factors are multiplied; the resulting value is called the Risk Priority Number (RPN)
- The RPN is used to prioritize the failure modes so that corrective actions can be taken to reduce the frequency, severity and/or improve the detectability of the failure mode
- PFMEA output is the starting point for the
  - Process redesign/leaning
  - Control Plan
  - Out-of-Control Action Plan (OCAP)



#### **PFMEA Benefits**




- Disciplined approach for identifying the ways a process design can fail before impacting the customer or the product function
  - Identifies potential manufacturing and/or assembly process failures
  - Identifies the significant process variables to control to reduce occurrence and improve detection of failure conditions
- Rational prioritization of potential failures for corrective/preventive action and/or redesign
- Helps to identify critical process parameters
- Provides critical input for the process control plan
- Opportunity to collaborate with and influence Raytheon designers to eliminate problems before they occur in your production line
- Smoother production ramps
- Reduced development, production and warranty cost
- Higher customer satisfaction



- Select proper team and organize members effectively
- Select teams for each process
- Create/agree on a ranking system
- Agree on format for the PFMEA matrix
- Define the customer and customer needs/expectations
- Define the process requirements
- Map the baseline process with a flow chart





**FAILURE MODE**: How a product can fail to meet design specifications or functional intent **CAUSE**: A deficiency that results in a failure mode → e.g. sources of variation **EFFECT**: Impact on customer if the failure mode is not prevented or corrected




- Process Engineer Generally the Team Leader
- Production Operators
- Industrial Engineer
- Design Engineer
- Quality Engineer
- Reliability Engineer
- Tooling Engineer
- Maintenance Engineer
- Project Manager
- Others including Sales, QA/QC, Operations



- Identify the process to map
- Ask the people most familiar with the process to help construct the map
- Agree on the start and end points; defining the scope of the process to be mapped is important, otherwise the task can become unwieldy
- Agree on the level of detail to use; it's better to start out with less detail, increasing detail only as needed to accomplish your purpose
- Identify the sequence and the steps taken to carry out the process; walk the line if necessary
- Construct the process map either from left to right or from top to bottom, using standard flow chart symbols and connecting the steps with arrows
- Identify key process characteristics as potential sources of failure
  - Is the process standardized, or are the people doing the work in different ways?
  - Are steps repeated or out of sequence?
  - Are there steps where errors occur frequently?
  - Are there rework loops?
- Analyze the results and document potential failure modes at each process step



#### HV Capacitor: High Level Process Map



Note: Test points are at winding, curing, assembly, weld, impregnation and seal



# Organizing Information Using the PFMEA Template



- List each process step from the process map
- Describe the potential failure modes for each process step
- Identify the impact of each potential failure mode on downstream processes, product functionality or the customer experience
- Identify likely causes in the process for these failure modes
- Describe the current process controls—if they exist—that are in place to contain the causes
- Assign appropriate values to Severity/Occurrence/Detectability to obtain RPN (note: scale descriptions are included in PFMEA template)
  - Severity: Scale 1-10, 1=no impact, 10=catastrophic impact/hazardous
  - Occurrence: Scale 1-10, 1=predicted <3 defects/million, 10=>500K defects/million
  - Detectability: Scale 1-10, 1=always detected by current control plan, 10=unable to detect
- Sort process steps by RPN number high-to-low to prioritize the action plan for maximum impact



												Rayth	theon S
Process ID							T	PFMEA Type:					
								PFMEA Number:					
								Prepared By:					_
							$\vdash$	PFMEA Date:					_
Drassa Land							+	Revision Date:					
Process Lead								Revision Date:					
Core Team Members:													
											Action Resu		
Process Step	Potential Failure Mode(s)	Potential Effect(s) of Failure	SEV	Potential Cause(s)/ Mechanism(s) of Failure	000	Current Process Controls	RPN	Recommended Action(s)	Owner	Completion Date	Actions Taken	New SEV	New DET
			0		0	0	0						+
			0		ō	n n	0						-
			0		0	0	0						-
			0		0	0	0						
			0		0	0	0						
			0		0	0	0						4
			0		0	0	0						4
			0		0		0						4
			0		0	U	0						4
			0		0	0	0						-
			0		0	l n	0						-
			0		ō	0	0						-
			0		ō	n n	0						-
			0		0	0	0						-
			0		0	0	0						Т
			0		0	0	0						
			0		0	0	0						П
		·	0	·	0	0	0						
			0		0	0	0						
			0		0	0	0						4
			0		0	0	0						4
			0		0	0	0						4
			0		0	1 0	0						





PFMEA Objective, scope and goal(s): Review capacitor assy/test process for potential failure modes and control/risk mitigation strategy Process ID Fictional Capacitor Assembly/Test PFMEA Type: PFMEA Number: XXXX1 Prepared By: Anybody PFMEA Date: 9/18/2006 Process Lead Process Engineering Manager Revision Date: A Core Team Members: Swage line operator, Welding line operator, Impregration line operator, Line Supervisor, Process Engineering, Design Engineering, Quality Engineering, Process Engineering Manager Action Results New OCC New DET Potential Effect(s) Potential Cause(s)/ Recommended Completion Process Step Potential Failure Mode(s) Current Process Controls Owner of Failure Mechanism(s) of Failure Action(s) Date Actions Taken Terminal brazing (cover and leaks, dimensions scrap 9 time and temperature 10 Helium leak test, ATP seat test, 3.5 315 DOE to optimize parameter settings PE/QE Complete thermal shock for robustness Assembly low capacitance 9 operator error, material 4 can size Review operator certification PE/QE/Line Complete requirements, mat'l requirements PE/QE/Line Swaging hi-pot, corona, DF, IR scrap 9 overheated dielectric, operator skill, 9 visual inspection, tooling, operator Process capability analysis Complete workmanship, tooling, swage quallification, electrical test Review operator certification dimensions requirements 136 Process capability analysis PE/QE/Line Welding leaks, dimensions, hi-pot, corona 8 fixtures, operator skill, 8.5 Helium leak test, bubble test, Complete chassis/cover dimension not fixtures, QC dimension Review operator certification specified, material type. requirements contamination S station review Impregnation corona rework 5 machine (time, temp, oil quality), 8 gas test, oil quality, water test, PM, 2 80 Process capability analysis PE/QE/Line Complete 5 2 1 10 operator low temp seal, electrical test Review operator certification requirements PE/QE/Line Impregnation DF, low capacitance scrap 9 machine (time, temp, oil quality), 3 gas test, oil quality, water test, PM, 2 54 Process capability analysis Complete low temp seal, electrical test Review operator certification operator requirements 3 3 2 18 3 fixtures, operator skill, 8.5 Helium leak test, bubble test, Process capability analysis PE/QE/Line Welding leaks, dimensions, hi-pot failure, fixtures, QC dimension Review operator certification chassis/cover dimension not specified, material type, requirements contamination 8 cap measurement, feel, dimension, 2 48 Process capability analysis PE/QE 3 3 2 18 Curing dimensions, soft, cap variation, DF | scrap or rework 3 variable compression time, variable Complete pressure, temp, humidity, time pressure/load cell. humidity/temp/time Winding capacitance, dimension scrap 2 operator error, winding machine, 8 FAV, measure capacitance, 2 32 Process capability analysis PE/QE Complete 2 3 2 12 material (thickness, elongation, dinemsions, hi-pot, PM, incoming and at-station inspection, set-up damaged, curls) adjustment Testing Pads damage to part 2 operator error, fixturing, toolling error 3 visual inspection scrap false failure 2 operator error, test fixture error 3 software error flag, verification 2 12 procedure, cal logs 0 0



Customer Success Is Our Mission

#### **Potential Process Failure Causes**



- Omitted processing
- Processing errors
- Errors setting up work pieces
- Missing parts
- Wrong parts
- Processing wrong work piece
- Mis-operation
- Adjustment error
- Equipment not set up properly
- Tools and/or fixtures improperly prepared

- Poor control procedures
- Improper equipment maintenance
- Bad recipe
- Fatigue
- Lack of Safety
- Hardware failure
- Failure to enforce controls
- Environment
- Stress connections
- Poor FMEA(s)



**Raytheon** 

### **PFMEA S/O/D Ratings**

AIAG Compiled Ratings										
Rating Severity of effect		Likelihood of Occurrence	Ability to Detect							
Hazardous and without  10 warning		Very high; failure is almost	Cannot detect							
9	Hazardous and with warning	inevitable	Very remote chance of detection							
8	Loss of primary function	Llight reported failures	Remote chance of detection							
7	Reduced primary function performance	High; repeated failures	Very low chance of detection							
6	Loss of secondary function		Low chance of detection							
5	Reduced secondary function performance	Moderate; occasional failures	Moderate chance of detection							
4	Minor defect noticed by most customers		Moderately high chance of detection							
3	Minor defect noticed by some customers	Low rolativoly fow failures								
2	Minor defect noticed by discriminating customers	Low; relatively few failures								
1	No effect	Remote: failure is unlikely	Almost certain detection							

Severity

Occurrence

Detectability




- If the control plan for the process step is adequate, no further action required (typically if RPN value is <20)</li>
- If the control plan for the process step is inadequate:
  - Identify differences between the current and the desired situation
  - Determine how the failure can be better contained and/or eliminated
    - Consider implementation of new or more effective process controls
    - Assess if process steps that don't add value to the output can be eliminated
    - Determine if design modification is effective at eliminating or reducing occurrence or detectability of the failure mode, and if it can be accommodated
- Document plan and reassess S/O/D and RPN values; is it enough?
- Separate between
  - Supplier actions
  - Raytheon actions
  - Joint actions
- Publish result and include in quote/feedback to Raytheon Engineering and Procurement teams
- Manage to the plan



- Standardized work instructions/procedures
- Fixtures and jigs
- Mistake-proofing tooling and/or product design
- Mechanical interference interfaces
- Mechanical counters
- Mechanical sensors
- Electrical/Electronic sensors
- Job sheets or Process packages
- Bar coding with software integration and control

- Marking
- Training and related educational safeguards
- Visual checks
- Post process inspection/testing
- Gage/MSA studies
- Statistical Process Control
- Design of experiments on the process/Robust process design
- Preventive maintenance
- Automation & Real Time Control





R60
Raytheon Six Sigma

Control Plan

**Equipment Supplement** 

- PFMEA is a team effort
- Promotes actionable input to the design phase
  - Designs can and do impact ability to execute processes, and vice versa
- Enables suppliers to add value and influence designs by highlighting functional concerns earlier in the design/development process
- The risk of some failure modes will be associated with:
  - Supplier process capabilities
  - Non value-added steps
  - Material or finish selection
  - Design requirements
  - Material flows
  - Rework flows
  - Test and/or detection strategies and capabilities
- Mitigation action plans could include:
  - Supplier actions
  - Joint Raytheon/supplier actions



#### Resources



#### Textbooks:

- <u>Failure Mode and Effect Analysis: FMEA from Theory to Execution;</u> Author: D.H. Stamatis
- The Basics of FMEA; Authors: Robin E. McDermott, Raymond J. Mikulak, Michael R. Beauregard

#### On the Web:

- http://www.fmeainfocentre.com/
  - http://www.fmeainfocentre.com/examples.htm
- http://www.isixsigma.com/tt/fmea/
- http://www.asq.org/learn-about-quality/process-analysistools/overview/fmea.html



