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
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


East Europe



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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Anti-Hungarian Sentiment in Romania Described *91CH0300A Budapest HITEL in Hungarian 9 Jan 91 pp 22-23*

[Letter to the editor by Tamas Kiss: "I Do Not Hope!"—
first paragraph is HITEL introduction]

[Text] We publish this stern-voiced and sobering letter even at the risk of probable Romanian objection. It must be made clear to Hungary's public, who is always engaged in talks about politics, that true reconciliation needs partners without ulterior motives. Unilateral good intentions and a search for peace lead only to national self-surrender and self-mutilation. Because of his personal circumstances, the author requested that we use a pseudonym.

My little grandson is forlornly watching the autumn rain, but he says with the optimism of his three years: "This also is going to go away soon and there will be summer again, right?" His mother, not wanting to sadden him, nods: "I hope, son." But she will get the heating fuel for the winter nevertheless.

Many a Hungarian statement has been uttered in the second half of the year about Transylvania's future. Laszlo Tokes, Geza Domokos, Sandor Csoori, or the official spokesmen of Hungarian foreign affairs, analyze the events very seriously and with thorough familiarity of the situation. They disclose the ever worsening conditions, call attention to the increasing dangers, and then, when one would expect some possible solutions, the usual refrain follows instead: We hope that the Romanians' attitude will change, we hope that they will become aware of the need to reconcile, we hope that they will get to know us better and like us more, we hope.

Policies or the destiny of a people cannot be built on pipedreams. Every serious hope must have some realistic basis. What could that be?

A unified and great Romanian national state had been the dream of the Romanians for almost two hundred years. They consistently put their hope on it when no possibility of achieving it seemed to exist. Then, as a result of the unbelievable and unexplainable blindness of the Hungarian "aster revolution" [the 1918-19 Bolshevik Revolution of Bela Kun, et al.], they acquired—by fluke—not only Transylvania, but also a significant chunk of the Hungarian Plains, and then after World War II, Stalin gave it to them again as a present because of his hatred for Hungarians. The Romanians know that they cannot really possess the unified and great national state they obtained until they free themselves from the pressure of the inherited nationalities which have much more experience and which stand above them in every respect. They inherited four such nationalities: the Germans, the Jews, the Hungarians, and the Bulgarians. Because of their cultural or numerical weakness, others did not present any threat.

Of the four, the Bulgarians were the most clever. At the time of the great Romanian bonanza, they acquired more wealth through diligent work than the Romanians had, and seized the first opportunity to reacquire enough territory to accommodate their own people. Then rapidly and skillfully, they relocated the population and consequently no justification could be found to repossess any part of that territory, even in their worst postwar situation.

It was much easier for the Romanians to free themselves from the Jews. First, they beat tens of thousands of them to death, but they did that so shrewdly that the world—and the Jews themselves—hardly know about it. At any rate, the Jews did not wish to stay. Indeed, their displacement began immediately after the war. The Romanian state sold them to Israel at a high price, and by now so few of them remain that even anti-Semitism, which is alive and well, is not thought of seriously by the small remnants of Jews.

The most characteristic case is that of the Germans. They fought against Hungarian rule for two hundred years, and they thought and found Romanians to be their most willing medium. They strongly supported Romanian rule both in 1918 and in 1940, only to have insignificant remnants of them awaiting the expensive permission to leave Romania 70 years after their wish had materialized.

Thus, only the Magyars continued to stand in the way of the great Romanian national dream, that of a Great Romania with one language and one ambition. With their number, their still superior culture and historic traditions, and especially their intolerable and incomprehensible wish to live as Magyars in the middle of the attained Romanian unity, they represent for Romanian consciousness—or rather for the Romanian collective subconscious feelings—the insurmountable anxiety of ancient serfdom that saturated their genes.

I know Romanians well. As a child and as an adult, at the prison and at the workplace, I know their language and their culture, their virtues and their flaws. Some of them are true and good friends of mine. I am welcome in the homes of simple and unknown country folks as well as serious intellectuals. In the prisons of Peter Groza, we fraternally divided among us the last bite of porridge. I would like to list here objective facts about them, not accusations:

1. I do not know any Romanian who could envision any Magyar community or culture still existing in a hundred years. There are some who regret it, and some who think of the destruction of the Magyar culture in Transylvania as a loss but still consider that fact unavoidable.
2. I cannot even imagine a Romanian who would believe that the Magyar people would be capable of relinquishing Transylvania. The more convincingly Hungarian officials state this, the more suspicion it arouses that they just want to bamboozle Romanians with such

an ominous lie. They do not think Magyars are offended to be considered "that stupid" to swallow this.

3. With a few—although at times very serious—exceptions, Romanians reared in the Magyar culture are the ones who are capable of really hating Magyars from their hearts. (The leaders of the Vatra organization are such people.) One could only have a subjective opinion of the cause of this but only the indisputable fact can be stated objectively.

4. Whatever the Romanians put their hands on during the past two hundred years they never let go, and they consider this their indisputable and self-evident right. This is why the idea in January that Magyar rights and institutions usurped by Ceausescu will be given back by the new Romanian leadership was a naive dream. In practice this would mean that Romanian teachers, engineers, directors, tradesmen, and civil servants would surrender their attained positions, buildings, workplaces, and institutions to the Magyars. Without exception, they consider even the thought of this an abhorring and dangerous heresy. (In Zilah, the Romanian leadership is exemplary in being understanding and unchauvinistic. They are proud of it and the Hungarians consider it a great victory that this year they allowed one or two Hungarian classes in the ancient Wesselenyi College. But let anyone demand that they give back the entire college and leave! This would really be a glaring example of Magyar ungratefulness and voraciousness.) Let us try looking, in light of these facts, at fashionable endeavors like winning the Romanians' love for Magyar culture (boasting about the superiority of Magyar culture?), inviting them to Magyar cities (to make them see the difference in comparison with threadbare Romanian cities?), convincing them of our peaceful intentions (shaming them with how primitive their chauvinism is, right?). And when all this fails, there comes the sentence, nicely sighed: We hope, we must hope that sooner or later the Romanians will take a liking to us and become our friends. After all, we live in one Europe....

With this we compromise our conscience. But what if the hope fails to come true? If the Romanians continue to be what they have always been in the last two hundred years, proudly identifying with their past, then what? Must not this question be raised? I would really like to know what the Magyar society or its leaders are planning to do in the event that the repeated open and decisive declaration of the Romanian people, government, parliament, and all responsible institutions that "we will never concede anything to demanding Magyars" proves to be true? Will we still be left with the "hope" until the last Transylvanian Magyar moves to small, truncated Hungary?

The Romanians consistently accuse us of lying. They are right. We consistently lie to ourselves, to each other, to the world, and to the powers which now and then do turn their attention to us and which do sense a moral responsibility for this entire miserable situation. The problem is not so great after all, we will solve it together with the

well-meaning Romanian people. What is the sense of this lying that brings no hope and has no purpose? Is it easier to set our three-year-old selves at rest that autumn is followed not by winter but by summer instead of carrying out the unpleasant task of getting heating fuel?

Perhaps it would be more useful indeed to acknowledge that the Romanian people, despite the nice and empty slogans and well-proven and attention-diverting siren voices of its politicians, simply do not need us either as brothers or as good neighbors, not even as servants. They will not need us in the future either. Only after accepting this fact can we think responsibly about what the solution should then be.

BULGARIA

Views, Background of Prime Minister Popov

*91BA0205A Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK
in Bulgarian 3 Jan 91 pp 1-2*

[Interview with Prime Minister Dimitur Popov by Lyuben Genov, OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK editor in chief; place and date not given: "Hope May Turn Into Reality"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

Support of the Government

[Genov] Why was it so difficult to form a government?

[Popov] As I said, forming a government became possible for lack of another solution. What was sought was an individual who would be greatly trusted by the political forces. The government was formed also thanks to the personal courage of the individuals who agreed to participate in it. For example, Mr. Ivan Pushkarov said about himself that he had made the fateful decision to take a daring risk. This definition of his personal standpoint is accurate. However, it is not a question merely of risk but of readiness, as well, to assume a heavy, not to say exceptional, burden. To participate in managing a country that is in such condition and to assume the head of such a difficult ministry is indeed a heavy responsibility. I, too, gave it a great deal of thought before giving my agreement. According to some, this was a government of suicides, of self-sacrifice or sacrifice. I do not think so. This is a government of people who have sensibly taken this step, realizing that no other solution was possible. If it is a question of assessing the degree of risk and, in that sense, of sacrifice, I am ready for self-sacrifice if it is for the good of the people and of our state.

We Are Marching Toward New State Structures

This is an interesting government not only from the point of view of its formula or its structure. The political agreement indicates that this is a government of peaceful transition to democracy—that is, a government with a mechanism through which the decisions made at the

roundtable meeting of the spring of 1990 are being implemented. It must extend the process that began with the elections in June, which made possible the existence of the Grand National Assembly and the election of a new president. These authorities already exist. However, it is obvious that they alone are not sufficient because we have no efficient executive authority, which is quite important in the implementation of these changes. We are indeed marching toward new governmental structures. One of the tasks of the government is to prepare and set up these structures after the elections for local self-government. Before that, however, we need a law about their nature. Will they be municipalities, and, if so, what kind? What will be the range of their jurisdiction and the subject of their activities? Obviously, the new municipalities must be entirely different from the old people's councils in terms of their nature and significance. The people's councils were the lower level of the totalitarian structure of the state. They were authorities the purpose of which was to serve precisely a strongly centralized power, the dictatorship. Obviously, the municipalities must be a place for the democratic participation of the people in the administration of the state. Another question is that of restoring the okoliyas and the okoliya managements, as a mechanism through which the state will implement its domestic policies. It is necessary to synchronize the two self-governing systems. Questions are being raised also concerning the (bolegati) and their managements. The mechanisms through which the government will be managing these agencies are very important.

As you can see, it is a question of a new state structure. Actually, in some respects we will be going back to the elements of the structure of the Bulgarian state as it was more than 40 years ago. We will be adopting the European practices, with their more advanced governmental systems. Consequently, the Grand National Assembly must pass at least two laws. The first is on the local self-government authorities, which should establish the nature and characteristics of these agencies so that we may see what we are choosing and what structures we are setting up. The second should be on the new administrative division of the country, which would enable us to establish the geographic areas and demographic structure, the economic potential, and the traditional historical, cultural, and other relations among settlements that form a municipality. We must create viable municipalities with adequately large populations that would be able to support themselves and engage in active efforts. Within the okoliyas we must have a balanced and relatively equal number of people. Furthermore, we must set up permanent electoral districts for the election of people's representatives to the future National Assembly. Whether there will be 200 or 250 representatives is a matter to be decided upon by the future constitution. If with such a law we establish permanent electoral districts, or districts that last at least 10 to 15 years, we will have ensured that every single people's representative will have a relatively equal constituency,

and that, in the next elections, the deputies will be elected under relatively equal conditions.

What happened last June? In some electoral districts—let us say in my native city, Kula—there were 28,000 to 30,000 voters. In General Toshevo, however, the electoral district had some 62,000 voters. In practical terms, one people's representative was backed by some 30,000 voters, while another was backed by nearly twice that number. In the practice of other countries, a tolerance of 15 to 20 percent or a maximum 25-percent deviation from the average electoral group is allowed; in the case of our Grand National Assembly, it was 45,000 (58,000 in Sofia).

With these two laws, the government will be able to organize the structure of the future Bulgarian state. After the elections, this structure will be given a staff, and the possibility of stabilization will appear. Subsequently, the new authorities must prepare themselves and hold parliamentary elections, something that will require at least two or two and a half months.

This is one of the tasks or hopes of the transitional government. Even if it had no other task, implementing this one properly would mean a great deal. [passage omitted]

The Truth About the Situation in Bulgaria

[Genov] On the basis of what the government has learned so far, what should the Bulgarian people know?

[Popov] Our people are unaware of the difficulty of our situation. We have virtually exhausted our resources, and, unless we are able to secure even a modest amount of raw materials and energy, by February or March many plants may have to be closed down. Our food reserves are reaching critical levels. We have no foreign currency with which to purchase food abroad. We are even short of money for medicine. As to why and how we got into this situation, that is a different matter. If the people are aware of this, they will know and understand why we will be unable to achieve quickly some of the things they want. For example, a number of people would like for the new government, after the new year, to fill the stores with goods, to eliminate waiting lines, to keep from increasing prices, and to guarantee that there will be a great deal more of what we need compared to what we have now or what we had a year ago.

Matters will improve, but this cannot be accomplished immediately or very quickly. I recently read something about the changes in Spain, which also covered an interesting distance from dictatorship to a democratic legal system. Some 10 years were necessary before the state could stand firmly on its own two feet. Or let us consider Poland. The struggle waged by Solidarity has been going on for 11 years, but it is only of late, after the daring plan submitted by Balcerowicz, which involved the mandatory participation of the people and a readiness to withstand privations, that Poland is stabilizing and is rapidly advancing toward what is known as a

"market economy." This was accomplished more smoothly in Hungary. However, Hungary had more time at its disposal as well as prerequisites unavailable to us.

We lost precious time because of inaction for at least seven or eight months, time that could have been used to accomplish what we are now facing. We will have to work with an acute time shortage.

[Genov] We are waiting for the government's program. Could you describe it, even though it is still only in the preparation stage?

[Popov] The program is a major task. However, we are helped by the political agreement that is the political foundation of the government. The agreement indicates the main trends. I will submit the programmatic declaration of the government to the Grand National Assembly. Because it is based on the agreement, it will not be debated. [passage omitted]

Some Problems With Our International Relations

[Genov] The public is quite sensitive about our relations with the giants, the United States and the Soviet Union. Many sins have been ascribed to our relations with the Soviet Union, and we are relying greatly on our relations with the United States. So far, the prime minister has not spoken in detail about his view on such matters.

[Popov] If anyone believes we should sever our economic relations with the Soviet Union, he is making a grave mistake. It is impossible to do that because it is precisely the Soviet Union that is the source of energy and some raw material resources without which our economy cannot function. We simply have no other place, for the time being, to obtain them. The Soviet Union is for us a major partner, and, considering that we have no alternative, if our relations are based on equality, this will be good for us. We have already concluded an important economic agreement with it.

At the same time, it is in our interest economically not to tie ourselves to a single country.

Our trade and economic policy must be directed toward other countries as well, on the basis of mutual interest and goodwill. Tremendous possibilities exist. We maintain traditional economic and other types of relations with some European countries, such as Germany, France, England, and Italy. And we should not underestimate our economic relations with countries such as Spain, Austria, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary. I had a discussion with a representative of Swiss political circles, who drew my attention to the intellectual assistance we could obtain from Switzerland. This would include, for instance, the training of young Bulgarian bank specialists in Swiss banks.

A special approach is needed in the case of some countries, such as the United States, Canada, and Japan, who could provide us with literally anything we need. I have reasons to believe they will provide us with such aid.

However, such countries must consider us a serious partner. We must substantiate the type of trust we discussed at the start of our conversation.

[Genov] If we were to apply this philosophy of interrelationship between Bulgaria and the rest of the world to the Balkans, what could we say about our neighbors?

[Popov] Let us start with the country with which, at present, our relations are in an enviously good condition—Greece. All in all, Greece has modest possibilities and is still not a full European Community partner. However, it is prepared to give us economic aid. A number of Greek citizens are coming here, expressing the wish to set up their companies and to work and trade with us. We are also receiving humanitarian aid from Greece as well as political support. In simple terms, the Greeks are opening their arms and hearts to our people and state.

Turkey, as well, has offered us aid and is giving us some. This neighbor of ours has some \$13 billion available. Until recently, we read and were told that it was a country sunk in economic hopelessness. It turned out that such was not the case. Our relations with Turkey should assume their traditional aspects of neighborliness, calm, and good intentions.

We must develop better relations with Yugoslavia. Interesting processes are developing in that country, processes that are of substantial significance in terms of the status quo and stability on the Balkan Peninsula. Yugoslav domestic problems are not without importance to us. I would say that currently we do not have the best possible relations with that country, as we should. Possibilities in many areas, including economics, remain unused.

Romania has a great many problems. We have good friendly relations with it, and there is no reason not to develop them further and to provide mutual aid, given our impoverished condition.

[Genov] Any mention of Turkey or Macedonia frightens many people....

[Popov] Such fears are based on the tense ethnic relations between some population groups in Bulgaria. This is an unpleasant consequence of the so-called renaissance process. Today, however, Turkey is showing goodwill. There is goodwill in our country, as well. Such tense relations could be improved, and ways to do so exist.

The question of Macedonia is somewhat different....

[Genov] Let us continue with ethnic relations. There have been fears that, by investing in our country, Turkish companies would be able to take over territories.

[Popov] I hope that the law on the land will eliminate any possibility of selling Bulgarian land to foreign citizens.

The government will do what is necessary to eliminate such fears. Ensuring the people of Turkish origin the

right to exercise their human rights and freedoms and to have their legitimate interests protected does not mean that people of different origins—in particular, the Bulgarians—would be deprived of such opportunities. Anyone who thinks otherwise is making a grave mistake. The state must guarantee equality in the eyes of the law and will do so. I deeply believe that such a policy would reduce ethnic conflicts and restore the tolerant and warm, human relations among people of different ethnic origins. Throughout history the Bulgarian people have displayed such tolerance.

[Genov] Has the Movement for Rights and Freedoms shown any desire to participate in the government?

[Popov] No. However, it has stated that it will support the government. It indeed supported it by supporting my mandate and giving the government a vote of confidence.

[Genov] A Turkish-language newspaper is already being published.

[Popov] That population has the right to have a newspaper in its native language. There is nothing unnatural in that.

As for Macedonia, that which only a month ago was reason to fear for one's personal safety and to feel insecure—that is, to declare one's Bulgarian origin and Bulgarian self-awareness—no longer exists. For example, the greatest electoral success was achieved by a party that does not consider it necessary to hide the Bulgarian awareness of its supporters. Note that this is a party of young people. I believe that this will facilitate our relations with the Republic of Macedonia. What do we share? We have the same language, the same faith, the same relatives. There are hundreds of thousands of families in Bulgaria whose roots are in Macedonia. One year ago I went on holiday to the Republic of Macedonia and I felt at home, and the residents exhibited the same behavior toward me, even though my native city of Kula is far from Macedonia.

[Genov] Speaking of families, what about Dimitur Popov's?

[Popov] The rumor that Aleksandur Lilov and I are cousins, that our mothers were sisters, has spread. In the course of the consultations that were held to form the government, he told me he had heard that my wife and he were cousins. My wife comes from Shiroka Luka. She is Exarch Stefan's niece. My family in Kula is totally unrelated to the Lilov family. My ancestors on my father's side were priests, teachers, public figures, and intellectuals. More than two centuries ago, my mother's family moved here from the Teteven area. That is all I can say about my family ties, about which some people are speculating, the reason being obvious. People are also speculating about my political preferences. In the past I have been called a "dirty SDS [Union of Democratic Forces]" or "dirty communist." As secretary of the

Central Electoral Commission, I have not given preference, even one iota, to either force. When the Mandate Commission submits its results to the Grand National Assembly, the people will see that what was made public by the Central Electoral Commission was an accurate reflection of the documents it received. However, this is explainable. Considering the reciprocal mistrust, prejudice, and suspicion, anyone can think and say what he wants. Stating in parliament that he will support the government headed by me, Dr. Petur Dertliev emphasized the following: "We greatly wanted Dimitur Popov, as secretary of the Central Commission, to do something to benefit us; the other side wanted the same. However, the man did not budge!" This is the unadulterated truth.

Naturally, even if I had wanted to, I would not have been able to change anything in the results because the commission received already processed documents and could not have changed their content. The system of receiving and reporting was such that no one could have changed anything. Anything that is said or written to the contrary is fiction or due to a lack of information.

[Genov] It has become fashionable to make one's possessions public knowledge. What property does the prime minister have?

[Popov] I have a modest, two-room house, purchased with a loan I paid off two years ago. The loan was from the Ministry of Transportation, where I had worked for 18 years. I was able to set up an office in the attic. I have a small cottage that I built myself, with the help of friends. I have a Lada, which was paid for out of family savings and money I earned for a number of years working as a journalist and author of books. I have no savings account. However, I have two daughters, two sons-in-law, and three grandsons, who are my greatest wealth.

[Genov] Until this greatest change in your life, what was your saddest moment?

[Popov] The loss of my mother and father. I was not a member of the party we know, despite my desire to advance as a specialist. I became a judge 20 years ago at the Sofia city court, and, until May 1990, when I was made court president, I had the same rank. There was something like "no higher," a "ceiling," and nothing else. Being doomed this way is cruelty. It is a depressing and depersonalizing element, sometimes fueling my ambition but most times demoralizing me. The person calms down and realizes that he not only lacks opportunity but also that it makes absolutely no sense to struggle for advancement. I remember that, when I went to the university to get my diploma, the official who gave it to me said: "What is the point of this diploma? You will be unable to find a job." I was surprised by that, but he turned out to be right. I had to work as a miner because I was unable to find work in my field.

[Genov] Where did you work as a miner?

[Popov] At the so-called second window, near Kokalyane. [passage omitted]

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Svitak's Views on Leftist Politics Criticized

91CH0295A Bratislava NOVE SLOVO in Slovak
10 Jan 91 p 14

[Guest commentary by university lecturer Jozef Gregor, Ph.D.: "A Critique of Professor Svitak's Criticism"]

[Text] Professor Ivan Svitak did not leave, figuratively speaking, a stone unturned when he addressed the conference of the Left Wing Convention on 5 November 1990 (NOVE SLOVO Nos. 47 and 48) about the current political representation of our ruling parties and movements.

All of his criticism of current policies, and of the policies of the Open Forum in particular, is based on the main premise that "the collapse of Communism must not turn into a victory of capitalism." At first glance it may seem that Prof. Svitak hit the bull's eye. Nevertheless, upon more careful reflection of the contents and method of his criticism, we can hardly avoid the impression that this is more a self-serving than a serious analysis of the given gamut of problems. Why so?

Professor Svitak maintains that "the logic of the history of revolutions is ruthless; it rests on the fact that after convulsions of enthusiasm and violence—or both concurrently—problems are back where they were before the explosion of passions." Furthermore, he alleged that the students were the first to pose the eternal question about the purpose of all revolutions: "What good was the revolution if its enthusiasm or its violence only delayed the solution of vital issues?"

Revolution is no rebellion. It has its own socioeconomic basis and political objectives. The objective in November 1989 was not a mere political coup but a social revolution which encompasses not only the area of politics but also of economics, culture and ethics. Why did it take place at all, and what was its purpose?

The ruling socialist power was unable to resolve the fundamental issue, the contradiction between the development of the forces of production and relations in production; it was unable to balance its policies with the economy, and vice versa. The economic change in the bosom of the old sociopolitical system proved to be unrealistic. Therefore, first a political revolution was inevitable and only after the political revolution could steps be taken toward radical socioeconomic, cultural, and ethical changes. In other words, what President Havel calls "the second revolution" may, or rather, must, take place if the only achievement is not to be a political coup.

The "first revolution"—that is, the political revolution in November—could be achieved by "gentle," "velvety"

means, without raw violence precisely because the ruling power was simply incapable of any resistance with the support of armed forces. The "second revolution" which follows the first one is always the more difficult and complex one, and as a rule, it is accompanied not only with disappointments about the resolutions of the "first revolution." Moreover, it is also more violent, with more rational objectives, and it goes on much longer than the political revolution because it must deal with accumulated socioeconomic problems which the political power could not resolve. The former totalitarian power was unable to fulfill the socialist revolution because it was prevented from doing so by obsolete power-political relations that lagged more and more behind the social development.

Professor Svitak shakes a finger in warning—the collapse of Communism must not turn into a victory of capitalism!

However, the real reason why the "collapse of Communism" occurred is that Communism was incapable of dealing with the fundamental historical contradiction between private ownership of means of production and their "socialization." It proved to be a naive idea that the "overhauling" of economic mechanisms might resolve this historical contradiction. Thus, the "second revolution" has its economic basis in return to capitalism as the starting point for recycled social, sociopolitical, cultural, and ethical changes.

The world "Communist experiment" failed not only because of subjective but also objective reasons; the needs of mankind have not yet reached a level where private ownership of means of production and production relations based on it would meet in an inextricable conflict with the social character of production.

How does Professor Svitak intend to prevent the collapse of Communism from becoming a victory of capitalism? Through left-wing opposition politics? Through an irreconcilable fight against the right-wing populism? By raising the spiritual and ethical (idealized) values of social utopias above consumer society? By declaring a merciless fight against the "totalitarian" dictatorship of money? Svitak's motto "Reprivatize socialism" is an illusory and unrealistic policy and social incentive.

To be sure, "Communism" (or the so-called real socialism) was in power for more than seventy years, yet it was unable to achieve qualitative changes of the economic structure so as to turn it into an incentive for the social structure; it failed to prevent the increasingly antagonistic process between the social structure and social ownership of means of production, and for those very reasons the entire society collapsed. The solution for that is a return to capitalism based on private ownership of the means of production. To blame and even to threaten the capital is sophistry rather than sober and logical appraisal of our actual situation.

This return to capitalism may proceed in a "sneaky" way or it may be accelerated, without compromise, radically,

more or less controlled, with various forms of participation of foreign investments and subsidies, and with greater or lesser social impacts, but nothing of that will make any change in the substance of the matter—we are at the threshold of radical changes in ownership relations. Of course, the existing social base will react to the restoration of private ownership of the means of production in proportion to the way this process develops. It is highly probable that the mutual process between denationalization and the existing (old) social base will become more acute particularly in the beginning. On the other hand, however, they will reach a compromise that will make it possible for capitalism to “win.” There can hardly be any doubts about that.

It cannot be precluded that during the transition to private ownership relations the existing social base may act “autonomously”; however, it is more than certain that this “autonomy” will be considerably restricted by the sociopolitical structure (superstructure) corresponding to new production relations in private ownership. The fact must be recognized that this is not a one-shot, temporary return to private ownership relations. This is an undeterminable but certainly extended period of time estimated at several decades and thus, generations. The subjective factor will correspond with this dimension of time. Even if the government and the policies should change far more frequently than under totalitarianism, it would not affect the private ownership character of sociopolitical relations.

I am absolutely against any underestimation of the subjective factor in the historical process, but I consider it equally wrong to overestimate it in any form or fashion. After all, the “collapse of communism” occurred largely because of the overrated importance of the subjective factor, be it in the form of a mob, a monolithic party or a leader.

The return to capitalism is an objective inevitability because the subjective factor has failed in the historical conflict between the private ownership of the means of production and the social character of production.

The subjective factor, based on “collectivism,” proved to be vague in every area of our public life—in politics, economy, culture and ethics. Its feedback is the consolidation of individualism, not of the platonic kind, but of the private ownership type. Freedom of entrepreneurship is above all an individual freedom, although associated with higher entities.

Analogically, political pluralism is based on individualism and intellectualism and not on “collectivism.” This return to political and economic individualism cannot be avoided even when setting up left-wing opposition against the “privatization” of socialized production. Otherwise that opposition will stand on feet of clay.

Even the very concept “left-wing opposition” should be judged from this aspect. It should be the “left-wing opposition” for something and not against everything. The old understanding of the “left wing” as a categorical

opposition against the right wing often hampers social progress. I think that the most important objective task of both the democratic right and the socialist left is to reinforce the foundations of the kind of democracy that can achieve harmony of private ownership in all its forms with the development of the entire society. What else but capitalism can now assume responsibility for the development of the whole society; what else can now lead our society out from our disastrous economic and social situation? Does Professor Svitak know anything else that could take over this role instead of capitalism?

Capitalism will definitely not have an easy task, precisely because “social achievements” already exist in our country (just as in the rest of the “Communist world”); because the spirit of collective “mediocrity” reigned in our country in every area of human action; because every member of our society had existential security and could work and live essentially “carefree.” However, a more demanding task will involve denationalization of exactly the social consciousness and replacing it with individual awareness.

By their essence ethics and culture are individual and thus, expressions of individual-intellectual conduct in this area will occur first, even if commercialization at present seems to be an unsurmountable barrier for the creation of permanent all-human values.

The question of nationality appears also in the forefront in the return to private capitalist relations. It is a logical and not exceptional phenomenon, as some political scientists may think. Nationalism is based on individualism; if capitalism is to be international, it must first become national—nationally individualistic. This process is even more acute in Slovakia precisely because Slovak economic nationalism could not fully express itself in artificial international collectivism.

If Professor Svitak is “courting” the Slovaks and siding with them, he does so only to contradict the current political line of the Civic Forum which he sees as amateurish and incapable of any radical solution of sociopolitical and economic problems. However, this is not enough to make the Czech partner understand the essence of the Slovak national question and the purpose of its constitutional organization. More is at stake; it concerns the historical identity of the Slovak nation and its statehood. It is not in the least against anyone, be they Czechs or Hungarians, or whomever, but for its own self-realization and full assumption of responsibility for its destiny even, or precisely, within the framework of federation.

It is obvious that Professor Svitak himself fails to realize what is at stake, as he promotes the view that Vladimír Mečiar, “an outstanding Slovak politician,” should replace Premier Čalfa at the earliest occasion so that “we would feel that the federal government may be taken seriously because it has a spine, a will, and a goal.” He regards Mečiar’s categorical imperative “Either I or he” as a good principle. But what has given Professor Svitak

the assurances that as the premier of the federal government V. Meciar would more resolutely support the federation than the interests of the governments of our republics? It is risky to proceed merely from Meciar's characteristics and to disregard broader correlations. However, in this instance it is a completely different question, namely, whether we want to have a strong federal state superstructure, a strong federal state, or on the contrary, strong governments of the republics led by dynamic men. In addition, the Slovaks have their experience that the federation, particularly the strong one, was more convenient for the Czechs than for the Slovaks. Therefore, they stress the establishment of strong governments of the republics in the first place and only then a strong federation as its consequence.

However, a still more relevant and fundamental question now comes up. Do we actually need a strong state, be it federative or national? After all, a strong state is inevitable precisely where civic democracy is not given space to assume responsibility for a large part of state functions. By postulating a strong state we in fact express in advance our lack of confidence in civic democracy.

We already had a "strong state" for 40 years, and the stronger that state was, the less democracy it afforded us. This is not a verbal expression of the ratio of the state to democracy; this concerns our historical experience to date. For that reason I prefer to underscore democracy rather than a strong federative state or strong state formations of the republics. It is proper to mention here that precisely in conjunction with the federative arrangement of the republic in 1968, the highest priority—democracy or federation—was the topic of discussions especially in Slovakia. Those who used to assert the view that the federation must be first enacted in law proceeded from the premise that space would then open for democracy. The reality turned out to be something else. Because of the absence of democracy, the federation became a sterile plan, an empty, purely formalistic phenomenon.

It is the logic of history that the more democratic the states are, the stronger they are, and not the other way around. Thus, I consider it decisive to build democracy and an authoritarian federal state and its components, the republics.

As for the CSFR's neutrality, Prof. Svitak assumed a very sarcastic attitude to current foreign policies. The Dienstbier faction simply has no chance to conduct the foreign policy in the interest of the nation and state! But whether the world is bipolar or not, one can hardly speak of neutrality of small states in the true sense of that word. Or does Prof. Svitak think it possible? Small states will always depend on their relations with superpowers. The conceit of the Czechs and Slovaks in the Civic Forum and in the Public Against Violence, who want to be the "measure of Europeanism of other nations," as well as of reformists in 1968, who wanted to be the "navel of the world," is an inexcusable naivete and should be scorned. However, I would prefer it if Svitak's sarcasm were

aimed against the superpowers. Despite their repeated assurances that they respect the interests of small states and nations, they always have good intentions only where it concerns their own sphere of interest. There is no end of examples from recent history: Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, Grenada, Panama, Kuwait. Historical pessimism of small states no longer can be set up on an absolutely inevitable fate because even the capitalism of the world superpowers is no longer sovereign enough to completely disregard the interests of small states.

And finally, a word about the historical purpose and mission of the left wing. Prof. Svitak proceeds from the age-old axiom that "in history the left wing had always represented efforts for change and not for reversal, for ideological values rather than for material possessions, and for equality rather than for protection of privileges of the elite." In other words, the historical mission of the left wing is not to change radically (and absolutely not to abolish) the relations of private ownership, but to fight for some kind of imaginary equality. Therefore, according to Svitak, the newly emerging left wing must not turn into a party "striving for power" but be only a movement whose task is "to protect national and state interests and not the interests of small businessmen who speculate about auctions of material possessions." On that basis, then, Prof. Svitak accords the left wing the right to have only a "minimum program," a quasi "communal" program, which precludes any possibility to touch positions of power of big capital. Prof. Svitak could not express this in a more meaningful way when he assigned the new left the role of creating "an association of common interest and later also a new Labor Party operating on the basis of a minimum left-wing program, roughly within the framework of the Second International." Prof. Svitak never mentions the "maximum program" of the new left. Thus, we may note that he conceives the left wing in broad terms because he does not exclude from it the former (and especially the reformed) and current Communists, and on the other hand, very narrowly because he clearly surmises that in its head will be social democrats; consequently, the new left rises and falls with the minimum program. The "left-wing Labor Party, the party of democratic socialists" will enter future elections with its minimum program. Prof. Svitak offers one-third (!) of potential voters the opportunity to cast their ballots for the Labor Party which "with the backing of the trade unions, will defend the interests of our industrial workers and implement the minimum program of the left wing." And what will happen if our industrial workers are not satisfied with the "minimum program"? Will then the new left stifle their higher ambitions, or pass them over to another political party?

Really, there seem to be far too many question marks in Svitak's address at the conference of the Left Wing Convention. But the very fact of Professor Svitak's sharply polemic address offers an opportunity for a more thorough analysis of his ideopolitical philosophy, even if in the same polemic vein.

Ludovit Stur's View on Czech-Slovak Relationship
91CH0294A Bratislava NOVE SLOVO in Slovak
10 Jan 91 p 15

[Article by Karol Rosenbaum: "Ludovit Stur Between Us and the Czechs—On the 135th Anniversary of His Death"—first paragraph is NOVE SLOVO introduction]

[Text] The idea to write a contribution to the above-mentioned topic occurred to me during the celebrations of the 175th anniversary of Ludovit Stur's birth as two "percents" (that is correct) of voices were interrupting the address by the chairman of the Federal Assembly, Alexander Dubcek, who also was born in Uhrovec. He did not adopt Stur's legacy and the legacy of Stur's generation only in 1990, but back in the 1960's, for example, in his speech in Hlboke to the afternoon "academia" organized in March 1967 as a tribute to Jozef Miloslav Hurban on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of Hurban's birth. The participants in the celebrations correctly understood Dubcek's declaration, especially when he spoke off the cuff. I recall this because Alexander Dubcek's relationship to Ludovit Stur has its history; it is not because he was born in the same community; it is not because of the office of the speaker of our highest legislative body. It has developed naturally. One may say that the heckling during Dubcek's address by the above-mentioned two "percents" was predictable but above all, indecent, inhumane and undignified. The heckling during his address increased at the first words of a quotation from Ludovit Stur. To refresh your memory, I quote them verbatim: "Some people may even think that we want to cut ourselves off from the Czechs, but God preserve us from any such separation. Who is now cutting himself off from his brothers, he will face the harshest judgment of our nation. As in the past, we want to maintain our unity with them; we want to adopt whatever excellent achievements they may have made; we want to stand with them as kindred minds, and at every opportunity we want to treat them as well as we expect them to treat us in return as brothers." Stur wrote this statement in the conclusion of his theoretical treatise "The Slovak Dialect, or the Need To Write in That Dialect" published in 1846. Stur was not alone with this view. Even earlier, in the second volume of the Nitra Almanach in 1844, Jozef Miloslav Hurban had expressed his opinion about the attitude to the Czech nation: "I know beforehand that the Czechs and allegedly some of us will not like it if Slovaks write in the Slovak language. Our Czech brothers who are not familiar enough with our situation in Slovakia will think that we are getting separated from them. However, literary unity is not the most important union; it only sets a basis for a true unity. We wish to assure them that we love them with the same love we feel for the Slavic peoples, and even more than ever before, and therefore, we embrace those Czechs with all our hearts and speak to them with the same love as before and even with greater affection." The statements by Stur and by Hurban before him reflected their era and stemmed from the legacy of the past although they were intended for the future.

If we take a better look at Stur's words about "not parting" with the Czech nation (that was the expression Ladislav Novomesky used publicly in his contribution to the debate on our relations with the Czech nation and its culture after 14 March 1939), we may sense that not only was it important to Stur that the Czech public not condemn the Slovak decision but he presented a precisely formulated program for mutual relations of both nations and their cultures; a program liberated from any traces of national animosity, an active program undergirded by democratism of national self-determination and equality.

It is true that several Czech intellectuals adopted a critical attitude toward Stur's program and toward the statements by his followers; even "some" Slovak intellectuals let themselves be heard, as Stur had predicted, most of all Jan Kollar who postulated not the Czech language but a language that would respect also certain Slovak elements. This encounter of the younger generation (i.e., intellectuals among whom only L. Stur, M. M. Hodza and S. Chalupka were over 30 years old in 1846) with the champions of the Czechoslovak linguistic unity ended with the victory of the proponents of a new literary language.

Nevertheless, this struggle was not easy and especially not brief. It went on until recently because it was a theoretical and philological argument and moreover, one with the characteristics of a political conflict. This fact cannot be ignored even in our time. Representatives of both the Slovak and Czech cultures and sciences participated in it; not only Czech and Slovak intellectuals but also prominent personalities of Slovak culture were split between roughly two camps, each of them divided into more factions. Even now impressions of tragic misunderstanding, incomprehension and errors on the part of the antagonists emerge when we read documentation about on the attack by Jan Kollar and his followers against the Slovak language and when we read the defense of the new language by Ludovit Stur and his supporters. Ludovit Stur and his group held the correct view in the conflict concerning the Slovak language, as confirmed by experience, the most important factor and argument, in whose name Ludovit Stur postulated the legalization of the new Slovak literary language. And what about the Czech intellectuals? How did they act in those days? It must be frankly noted that their attitude to Stur's courageous step was mostly negative, although some intellectuals understood it and tried to calm the troubled public waters; however, the most prominent personalities opposed the legalization of the Slovak language. Nevertheless, Stur would never cut off his contacts with Czech intellectuals; he argued but also tried to convince them. He realized that his chief opponents were among the Slovaks. In 1846, Czech cultural institutions published "Voices on the Need to Have a Common Literary Language for the Czechs, Moravians, and Slovaks" with contributions by Slovak authors. However, even this step did not shut the Czech door for L. Stur. Moreover, after a warrant for his arrest was

issued, in April 1848 Ludovit Stur fled to Vienna and then to Prague where, according to Josef Vaclav Fric, a young Czech radical, he witnessed how after one of his addresses young students in Prague spiked an issue of the "Voices..." on his dagger and burned it publicly. Stur attended the Slavic Congress convoked for early June of 1848 and spoke there together with P. J. Safarik in the spirit of revolutionary slogans about freedom of nations promoted by the French February Revolution. He endorsed a transformation of the Austrian Empire and tried to obtain a new status for the Slavic nations within it. He coined the words of the program calling for the foundation of an "independent Western community of the Czechs, Moravians, and Slovaks" and for the introduction of "political rights equal to those in all other nations of the Austrian Empire." It was one of the most progressive views expressed at the Slavic Congress in Prague which was dispersed by the imperial army.

His contacts with the Czech cultural circles continued even after the revolution had been suppressed during the period of Bach's absolutism which put Stur under police surveillance. Bitterly disappointed by the duplicity of the government in Vienna, he turned to the aspirations and visions of the future for his nation and the Slavs and immersed himself in scientific work. It was impossible for him to publish his work in Slovakia, so he turned to Bohemia and Russia. In 1853 the committee of the Czech Matic cultural organization published Stur's "On Folk Songs and Legends of the Slavic Tribes" transcribed into Czech by Janko Kalinciak. Stur's book *The Slavic Nations and the World of the Future* in Russian translation appeared only after Stur's death in 1867 and in German translation as late as 1931. We have been waiting to this day for its Slovak edition.

Conflicts around Stur's linguistic reforms continued for nearly a whole century. It may be said that the attitude toward Stur, his demands and principles divided camps also as concerns the relations between the Czech and Slovak nations. Toward the end of the 19th century the disputes became quite heated; they went on until almost the middle of the 20th century. They involved not only clashes between the advocates of Czechoslovak national unity and the Slovak nationalist camp, but also differentiations in that camp. Instead of making the legacy of Ludovit Stur's work relevant for the solution and consolidation of relations between both fraternal nations, it was either thwarted or rejected. It is hard to believe that in 1920 in his book *The Czechoslovak Schism* Milan Hodza, a democratically inclined politician, called the legalization of the Slovak language a "Hungarian political matter"; the same year Jozef Skultety protested against it in his book *One Hundred and Twenty-Five Years in Slovak Life*. Hodza thus formulated the attitude to Stur's act even more radically than Jan Kollar. Alas, a new dispute about Stur was generated by the views of Albert Prazak, a prominent Czech literary historian who negatively assessed Stur's program in terms of the Czechoslovak language, culture and national unity. Jozef Skultety and other Slovak scientists again protested. The

struggle for Stur's legacy was a struggle for the recognition of the Slovak nation as a distinctive entity historically already fully formed. Not only the national camp, which did not try to ignore Stur's positive attitude toward the Czech nation and toward the Slavic peoples, but also the nationalist camp, which concealed and evaded the above-mentioned values of Stur's work, are invoking Stur's name.

A change took place in the Czech cultural public after the restoration of our common state in 1945. Attacks stopped; occasionally expressions such as "separation" or "divorce" still kept cropping up here and there. A new view of Stur was linked with the recognition that the Slovak nation is singular, Slovak language distinctive, and Slovak culture expresses Slovak national specifics. This was a fundamentally new attitude, and we have no reason to ignore it. New interest in Ludovit Stur's life and work was gradually emerging in Czech culture. New works were published, for instance, by Jan Linhart (1952) and Zdenka Sojkova [as published] who is the author of a broadly conceived monograph of Ludovit Stur published in Slovak under the title "When Life Dawns" (1956). A few years ago (1986) Vladimir Forst published a book about Ludovit Stur with a selection of Stur's works. Quite symbolic was the fact that a selection from Stur's works appeared as the first volume of the Slovak Library in 1956.

However, the years after the liberation were not without problems even as concerns Stur and the movement he led. On the occasion of the centennial of the 1848-1849 revolutionary movements Ladislav Novomesky was greatly concerned about their objective evaluation. He initiated several programs, among them the publication of the book *Freedom Bell 1848*, whose author was hiding behind the pseudonym Juraj Pokorny. In reality it was the Czech historian Zavis Kalandra who had split with the CPCZ in 1937 in protest over the trials in the USSR; he himself had to pass through Nazi concentration camps. After the liberation he devoted himself to scientific endeavors. Ever since his work as editor of the Czech Communist and left-wing press he had been Ladislav Novomesky's collaborator and friend. When Novomesky "commissioned" Kalandra to write the above-mentioned study, he put himself at great risk because one year after the publication of his book Kalandra was unjustly accused and executed. This tragic case must also be noted in the context of the attitude of Czech culture toward Ludovit Stur and his generation.

Ludovit Stur's personality looms high above the time when he lived and worked. In the 1950's Stur's work was the shield of our national culture against those politicians and groups who were acting unpatriotically. However, they could not muster any more serious action. Figuratively speaking, Stur has won every battle. His opponents always lost. Moreover, the above-mentioned "two percents"—the hecklers at the October celebrations in Uhrovec—are also losers.

HUNGARY

Jeszzenszky on Soviet-Baltic, East-West Relations

91P20196A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
22 Jan 91 p 8

[Article by Aasmund Willersrud: "Hungary Fears a New Glacial Period in East-West Relations"—first two paragraphs are AFTENPOSTEN introduction]

[Excerpts] The spirit from Paris is in overwhelming danger of being smothered beneath the Kremlin's tanks in the Baltic region. "In order to rescue it, Europe must react firmly, but carefully, toward the Soviet Union," says Hungary's Foreign Minister Geza Jeszzenszky.

"It serves no purpose to kick a proud man in the rear end, no matter how much he deserves it," emphasizes the prominent Hungarian politician. As a historian he knows very well what superpower prestige means; it even has a certain legitimacy.

Budapest—The danger that the spirit from Paris will not be able to survive this crisis is real, the foreign minister confirms in a discussion with AFTENPOSTEN. Jeszzenszky will shortly be touring the Nordic countries, but the planned visit to Norway has naturally enough been postponed because of the King's death.

"The CSCE summit in November marked the end of 50 years of confrontation in Europe. In this situation, Hungary does not want to do anything that could be construed in Moscow as a provocation or a hostile action. A form of diplomatic recognition of Lithuania or exchange of consular relations would at present only have such an effect, and in no way influence the Kremlin to restrain itself," opines Jeszzenszky. With this he answered AFTENPOSTEN's question on why Hungary has not accommodated President Landsbergis' burning appeal for recognition.

"Hungary has limited influence, but rather than risk a break, we will try to pressure the Soviet Union to talk with the Balts and resolve the problems at the negotiation table. We must keep the Soviet Union as a cooperation partner as long as it can be done, but obviously there could come a time when that is no longer possible," concedes Jeszzenszky.

A Shock

Do the Hungarians themselves feel safe today, and out of reach of the Soviet generals? "The sight of the Lithuanians who were crushed under Soviet tanks was a true shock for us, and many Hungarians are afraid that something similar could happen again here. Geographically we are situated much closer to the Baltic states than to the Gulf. But we are not afraid, and are prepared to show our solidarity. The Lithuanians have always received moral support from Hungary," the foreign minister says.

We ask whether it does not feel disagreeable to be together with the Soviet Union in the Warsaw Pact for another year, since Moscow now has demonstrated the same methods as those used in Budapest in 1956. He confirms that Hungary would like a quicker dissolution of the pact, as soon as this year, but is uncertain whether that will be possible now. The plan is a formal "burial" at the planned 1992 Helsinki meeting. Meanwhile, the pact exists only as a consulting body, without any military significance for Hungary whatsoever. "We no longer take any military orders from outside our borders." [passage omitted]

Double Monarchy

"The most important thing in avoiding a break with the Soviet Union is to keep the economic ties across all of Europe," emphasizes Jeszzenszky. "We have an example of how badly things went when Austria-Hungary was broken into pieces and intentionally divided by the victorious forces after World War I. This stimulated centrifugal forces having a very unfortunate effect." The foreign minister himself hints at a certain nostalgia for the old double monarchy but does not think that it should have been held together by force. "It is nevertheless true that the economic splitting of the kingdom was very unfortunate," he says. "Today it is the Hungarians who remained within the new border designations in Slovakia and Transylvania (in present-day Romania) who are the cause of both bitterness and friction between 'the new democracies' in East Europe." Personally, the foreign minister's old upper middle class family has roots in both of these areas.

As an extension of this, he now advises the Soviet leadership to agree to concessions to the Baltic states. "In this way he [Gorbachev] can keep the union together even if this means granting freedom in an organized way to the people who want to be free. Negotiation leaves the door open for continued economic ties."

Foreign Minister Jeszzenszky is visiting the Nordic countries prior to any visit to the Soviet Union. Nor has Prime Minister Jozsef Antall been on an official visit to Moscow, which was an obligatory first stop for every leader in "the old days." Today there exist no unresolved matters which make a Moscow trip necessary. In the Nordic countries he wants to increase confidence in Hungary and show what the new government stands for "economically and politically," as he says.

Jeszzenszky is uncertain about how large an influence orthodox forces are gaining in Soviet politics. He compares it with the situation in Hungary up to the middle of October 1989, when no one was sure which way it would go here. "We had a government of reform-oriented Communists, but it faced an inner opposition. Moreover, the labor militia—Communism's elite troops—which was loyal to any order that might be given, still existed. That we arrived at a positive solution in the end, is due to the fact that the Democratic Forum opposed the

most radical demands. We realized that they only served to reinforce the orthodox forces," he says.

During Geza Jeszenszky's short time as foreign minister Hungary has moved far more quickly toward integration in Europe than any of the other former East Bloc countries. In November the country was granted full membership in the European Council, from the beginning of this year it holds associate membership status in the EC and from 1995 on Hungary hopes to move in as a full member. A cooperative agreement with EFTA [European Free Trade Association] will provide the country with insurance with respect to a future agreement between the EC and EFTA.

There has been a sharp turn toward the West, yet the government claims a complete political and national consensus on this policy. "Indeed, in such times of crisis this political support is further strengthened," concludes Geza Jeszenszky.

Members of Parliament, Voter Profiles Analyzed

91CH0279A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian No 49, 8 Dec 90 pp 89-91

[Article by Agnes Vajda and Janos E. Farkas: "Who Are Those Deputies?"—first paragraph is FIGYELO introduction]

[Text] The Sociological Research Information Association (TARKI) has recently compiled a volume of sociological and statistical analyses under the title "Social Report 1990." The studies included in the book examine various aspects of Hungarian society as it was in 1990, starting from changes in demographic trends, composition, and living standards, to the sociological makeup of the candidates running in the March 1990 parliamentary elections, and of the elected members of parliament. The authors of this paper, associates of the Central Statistics Office [KSH], have expanded the scope of the study that they contributed to the book that was published last week, and the article below reflects their new findings.

Of those surveyed, 80 percent of the candidates were city-dweller professionals with leadership experience and white-collar backgrounds. This is in line with what we had expected, and it satisfies certain statistically measurable, formal requirements which a group of career politicians must meet. We found no significant differences among the candidates of the various parties in terms of educational level. Only in five organizations was the ratio of professionals below the average: FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] (many of their members are university students), the Smallholders (65 percent), the Social Democrats (52 percent), the MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party] (67 percent), and the Entrepreneurs' Party (39 percent). The ratio of village representatives was significantly higher among candidates of the Smallholders (34 percent), the Agrarian Alliance (40 percent) and the MNP [Hungarian People's Party] (34 percent). The ratio of managers was higher

than average among the candidates of the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] (65 percent), the Agrarian Alliance (81 percent), and the HVK [Patriotic Election Coalition] (62 percent). Only among the candidates of the MSZMP and the MSZDP [Hungarian Social Democratic Party] were there significant numbers of workers. Self-employed candidates came mostly from the ranks of the Smallholders and the Entrepreneurs' Party. According to the widely used survey, although admittedly superficial and imprecise when pertaining to categorization by employment and assignment, the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], and the Christian Democrats had nominated the most nonmanagerial professionals (intellectuals) as candidates.

Breakdown of Candidates and Deputies
by Profession
(in percent)

Profession	Candidate	Deputy
Enterprise and cooperative managers	13.5	4.1
Private business managers	1.6	1.8
State administrative executives	7.8	3.1
State administrative employees	1.9	0.8
Party leaders and functionaries	2.4	2.1
Enterprise staff members	9.1	7.3
Other white-collar professionals	4.2	1.8
Engineers	1.2	6.2
Lawyers	2.5	6.2
Legal advisers	2.2	2.3
Doctors	6.1	9.1
Veterinarians	1.9	2.8
College instructors	3.4	7.3
High school teachers	7.8	7.8
Researchers	3.5	10.4
Economists	3.7	6.7
Employees in public education	1.8	2.1
Journalists	1.5	4.4
Artists, sports personalities	1.1	3.4
Clergy	1.2	2.6
Military	0.8	—
Blue-collar workers	10.9	3.4
University students	1.3	1.8
Unknown	8.6	2.6

Of those surveyed 62 percent of the candidates responded that prior to their present party affiliation,

they had not belonged to any other political party. For understandable reasons, only membership in the MSZMP was mentioned by significant numbers of candidates, as only the older ones could have belonged to the former parties. Among the new parties—although not unheard of—there has not been much crossover worth mentioning. Some of the former MSZMP members still belong to that party. More than 90 percent of the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] candidates had belonged to the Communist Party, and the ratio of former MSZMP members was also high among candidates of the Agrarian Alliance, the Patriotic Election Coalition, and the Hungarian People's Party. A much higher ratio of the candidates talked of having belonged to the youth organizations of certain parties (59 percent). Among the Smallholders and the Christian Democrats, which have

larger concentrations of older candidates, this ratio is less than 30 percent, while in the other parties it exceeds 60 percent.

On average 8.5 percent of the candidates have told us that they had been interned, deported, or placed under restrictions (the ratio of such respondents was higher than average among the Smallholders, Christian Democrats, Free Democrats, and Social Democrats). We found the greatest ratio of candidates (20 percent) speaking of such abuses among the Christian Democrats. Of the candidates, 23 percent said that they had been fired from their jobs, had their passports taken away, or been barred from publishing because of their political convictions (Smallholders: 47 percent, Christian Democrats: 34 percent, Hungarian People's Party: 34 percent, SZDSZ [Association of Free Democrats]: 32 percent, MSZDP: 28 percent, and MDF: 27 percent.)

Percentile Breakdown of Candidates of Parties by Profession

Profession	FKgP	FIDESZ	KDNP [Christian Democratic People's Party]	MDF	MSZP	SZDSZ	Successor Party	Independ- ent	Other **
Former politicians	—	3.1	1.0	2.7	20.5	0.8	13.3	15.1	7.4
State sector executives	13.8	3.1	12.1	11.3	26.7	5.5	29.6	17.4	9.8
Private business managers	1.1	1.6	1.0	1.1	1.4	1.6	2.2	—	2.9
Enterprise staff members	28.7	10.9	24.3	12.4	7.5	18.0	10.6	12.8	17.6
"Independent" white-collar professionals	30.8	31.3	40.4	63.4	32.9	60.2	29.2	39.5	24.0
Blue-collar workers	19.1	12.5	9.1	4.3	5.5	3.9	6.2	5.8	29.4
Dependents, unknown	6.5	37.5	10.1	4.8	5.5	10.0	8.9	9.4	8.9
Total number of persons	94	64	99	186	146	158	226	86	204

*MSZMP, Patriotic Election Coalition, Agrarian Alliance

**Candidates of the remaining nine parties entered in the elections, most of them belonging to the MSZDP and the Hungarian People's Party

Breakdown of Candidates by Their Self-Declared Characteristics and Last Profession/Assignment (in percent)

Candidates	Characteristic	Last Assignment
Manager	30.2	41.6
Staff white-collar	47.1	36.5
Independent professional	4.6	4.9
Other	18.1	17.0

Most of the candidates (54 percent) mentioned their role in their place of residence and immediate environment as their most important reason for becoming candidates, and a similarly large percentage of them (51 percent) spoke of familiarity with the issues because of their jobs and popularity as similarly important reasons. A much smaller, albeit still significant number of them (20 percent), used past affiliation with the opposition as their main motivating factor, and only a relatively small percentage (10 percent) cited popularity and name recognition as reasons for running. The greatest percentage

of references to past roles in the opposition (44 percent) came from Smallholder candidates. A greater than average number of MDF, SZDSZ, and Christian Democratic candidates, and a relatively large number of FIDESZ candidates also gave similar answers.

An unusually large number of independent white-collar professionals have appeared on the political scene as candidates. Could all of these doctors, engineers, college instructors, research sociologists, practicing lawyers and artists be looking for a new career? According to the data, 71 percent of our parliamentary deputies come from these strata. What we are witnessing, therefore, is a rather significant "elite transfer." Only among the candidates of the MSZP, and especially among those of the successor parties that have failed to get a single seat in parliament have the political and economic leaders of the former system been represented in notable numbers. Of our elected lawmakers, 36 members represent the economic and political leadership of the former system (for the most part these are members of the MSZP faction, half of which is made up of people of this background). Of these 36 deputies, 16 are managers of a state enterprise or cooperative. This data also indicates that the system change did not begin with the parliamentary elections. Evidence of this is the fact that the managers of newly formed, nonstate owned businesses (mostly private cooperatives) had already entered the political arena in significant numbers. Of the parliament members, seven deputies manage private businesses, which means that even though their contribution to the economy is still insignificant, private enterprises are already able to assert themselves in the political arena.

It would require scientific political analysis to determine why the ruling party and the largest opposition have attracted the greatest number of their candidates from among the "independent intelligentsia."

Data suggest that 44 percent of the candidates are employed by state-funded institutions and 22 percent by state enterprises. State-supported institutions have been the source of a greater than average number of candidates for three important parliamentary parties: the MSZP, the SZDSZ, and the MDF. It appears, therefore, that the economic elite has not been the main base of recruitment for the new political elite. At the same time, there is no question that the ratio of candidates employed in nonstate run enterprises (15 percent) has been remarkably high compared with the relative weight of these types of businesses in the national economy, and considering the fact that most firms of this type were only established in the past few years. We should point out, however, that the majority of these candidates did not make it to parliament, as most of them had run in the colors of the Entrepreneurs' Party, which failed to win any seats.

Most white-collar candidates began their careers as white-collar professionals with 75 percent of them having been appointed to white-collar staff or managerial positions in their first job, or having worked as

independent professionals. When asked to state their occupation most often they referred to themselves as "independent" staff-level professionals. A relatively large number of them were self-employed professionals: 8-9 percent of them made, or were forced to make, their living outside of the work place hierarchy.

The white-collar representatives of the two large parties—the MDF and the SZDSZ—formed from the two main wings of the former regime's opposition also have a lot in common with the candidates of the parliamentary successor to the former state party (and at the same time differ, let us say, from the Smallholders or some of the MSZMP's successor organizations that failed to win seats in parliament). It is true that even the most thoroughly compiled set of social statistics would be inadequate for describing those cultural roots, traditions, lifestyles, and ideology-shaping influences which determine a person's choice of values. This means that we are talking only about similarities that can be statistically demonstrated, and that obviously this picture might look different if we had other, more sensitive sociological information gathering techniques at our disposal. On the other hand, the degree of representation afforded to these three parties clearly reflects the relative weight of the three dominant factions of our intelligentsia which assert the greatest influence on public opinion and are the most politically active. Moreover, these three factions do not differ from one another on the subject areas examined as much as they collectively differ from the representatives of our politically marginal workers' parties, peasant organizations, and small and big business groups, which, for various reasons, do not wield real influence in Hungary today.

[Box, p 90]


Voter Profile

According to a survey conducted by TARKI that appeared in the "Social Report 1990" that was published last week, the memory of the respondents approached two months after the March 1990 elections seemed to be distorted in favor of the winners.

Among other things, the researchers asked 1,000 respondents to state whom they had voted for in the various rounds of the elections, and whom they would have voted for if the elections had been held at the time of the survey, i.e., at the end of May 1990. It is rather well known from international professional literature that over time the memory of the electorate tends to become distorted in favor of the winners. Of the votes actually cast for party slates of candidates, fewer than one-quarter went to the MDF, while more than one-third of the respondents queried in May remembered to have voted for the MDF, and even more would have done so had the elections been held at the end of May. Some of the "memory-loss affected" respondents were MSZP voters, but most of them were affiliated with parties which because of the 4 percent limit did not win a seat in parliament.

Social Outlook Deemed Desirable by Voters of Parliamentary Parties (as a Percentage of the Given Party's Total Voter Constituency)

A parlamenti pártok szavazói által kívánatosnak tartott társadalomkép (az adott párt összes szavazójának százalékában)



Key:

1. Percentage
2. Democratic socialism
3. Liberal market
4. Social market
5. Own Hungarian course


In terms of social and demographic characteristics, there are very few differences among the constituencies of the various parties. The voters of FIDESZ, the MSZP, and SZDSZ are somewhat better educated than the average, while the Christian Democrats and Smallholders have less schooling. A higher than average percentage of men voted for the MDF and the Smallholders, while a somewhat higher percentage of women voted for the other parties. More young people voted for the SZDSZ, and especially for the FIDESZ. More middle-aged voters cast their ballots for the MDF, and more middle-aged and elderly voters lined up behind the MSZP than their relative ratio of the populace would have suggested (to use the professional term: they were overrepresented), while among the voter constituencies of the Smallholders and Christian Democrats, the number of people over 60 far exceeded their relative numbers among the populace.

More or less the same percentage of skilled workers cast their votes for all parties. Also somewhat overrepresented were abstainers among the unskilled workers,

support for the two historical parties among semiskilled workers, preference for one of the other four parties among white-collar workers—particularly for the SZDSZ among midlevel professionals; affinity with the FIDESZ among staff-level, white-collar workers; and backing for the MDF and the MSZP among managers and executives.

The researchers found no significant differences of opinion among voters of the different parties on the privatization of state property. Complete rejection of privatization was the least commonly felt sentiment among the SZDSZ voters, although there, too it amounted to more than 10 percent. In no case did more than 25 percent of a given party's voters hold this opinion. At the same time, when asked how they would feel about the privatization of their own places of employment, 40-50 percent of the respondents objected to the idea, and surprisingly, it was among the voters of the FIDESZ that the ratio of this kind of a response was the highest. Only one-third of the voters indicated a

Average Level of Education Among the Voters of Parliamentary Parties (Number of School Years Completed)

A parlamenti pártok szavazóinak átlagos iskolai végzettsége (az elvégzett osztályok száma)

preference for the Right, and a little less than 20 percent for the Left. In other words, in the case of more than 50 percent of the electorate the Left vs. Right dimension was not a consideration factor at all. Of the two largest parties, the MDF, purports to be Right-Centrist, while the SZDSZ sees itself as Left-Centrist entity, yet interestingly enough, an identical percentage of the voters of both camps claimed that they had voted for their respective parties because of what they perceived was their right-wing orientation. The one exception was the MSZP: 70 percent of its voters were influenced by the fact that their party was representing the Left.

The party structure that became crystallized in the election campaign can best be visualized in a three-dimensional framework. Relationship with the past turned out to be the most important dimension. This explains why the MSZP ended up in fourth place in the contest of parties. The otherwise broad appeal of the "change, but with stability" approach has boosted the voter ranks of the MDF the most, while the self-professed Left-Centrist SZDSZ party won a relatively large number of votes from those calling for a change in the political system toward the Right. The second dimension had to do with the parties' view of how, and how radically the system change should occur. During the campaign, the SZDSZ had come across as a proponent of more rapid and radical economic changes, while the MDF presented itself more as a champion of radical changes in the political power structure and of symbolic and slower economic changes. It appears that the promise of symbolic changes was more appealing to the

majority of the voters. Presumably in the case of the Smallholders it was also the promise of this kind of change rather than that party's agricultural program that had helped to build strong voter support. Only in the third dimension did we encounter the traditionally most important element of multiparty democracies: the dichotomy between the Left and Right.

POLAND

Czechoslovak-Polish Relations, Stereotypes Viewed**Historical Tensions Reviewed**

91EP0218A Warsaw WPROST in Polish No 49,
9 Dec 90 pp 24-25

[Article by Boguslaw Mazur: "Poland-Czechoslovakia Borders on Fire: Poles Repressed the 'Prague Spring,' Czechs Were Ready To Enter Poland in December 1981"]

[Text] We become indignant that the Czechs and Slovaks are closing their border to us, forgetting that the Polish-Czech border has never been a particularly friendly one or that it has only been thanks to a fortunate course of events that there has been no war between supposedly brotherly nations.

There was a dispute over Cieszyn Silesia (Zaolzie [the area beyond the Olza River], along with Spisz and Orawa) throughout the period between the wars and for

a few years after the end of World War II. Zaolzie was inhabited mainly by Poles, while the inhabitants of Spisz and Orawa were for the most part Slovaks. Both sides usually used ethnic arguments in the disputes. The Czechs cast doubt on the Polish character of Zaolzie, because the Czech armies struck Cieszyn Slask unexpectedly and even threatened Krakow, before being defeated near Skoczow. After the cease-fire, the Supreme Council created by the heads of state of the great powers decided to hold general elections in the disputed area, but, in July 1920, the Polish government had to ask the great powers for help with the war against Soviet Russia. In exchange for this help, the Polish government left it up to them to resolve the Zaolzie dispute. The great powers immediately awarded Czechoslovakia most of Cieszyn Silesia, with all its coal mines, as well as much of the territory of Orawa and Spisz, which were of far lesser economic significance.

Throughout the two decades between the wars, the foreign policy of Poland and Czechoslovakia also took different directions. The Czechs had traditionally been sympathetic to the Russians, while Poland feared both White Russia and Bolshevik Russia. The Czech government did not believe the Polish borders were permanent, but it did consider Russia to be a suitable counterbalance for the power of Germany. This caused the Czechoslovak side to support the Ukrainian independence movement in Poland.

Poland's role in the division of Czechoslovakia cast a shadow over the history of relations between the two countries. A year before the outbreak of World War II, the Polish Army took over Cieszyn Silesia with great fanfare. Jozef Beck, the great helmsman of Polish foreign policy, was assuming that the Germans would be satisfied with just the Sudeten, that the Czechs would retain their sovereignty, and that, in addition to Zaolzie, Poland would gain influence over Slovakia and a common border with friendly Hungary. Most of these plans turned out to be fantasies.

During the war, the emigre governments of Wladyslaw Sikorski and Edvard Benes tried at least on paper to make a significant breakthrough in relations between our countries, with the revival of the idea of forming a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation to serve as a counterweight to Germany and the USSR, as a first step toward the creation of the great confederation Miedzymorze [Between the Seas]. On 23 January 1942, a Polish-Czechoslovak confederation agreement was signed, whereby a future union of the two countries would conduct joint foreign and economic policy and create a joint government. Benes ended this agreement in January of 1943, correctly realizing that Sikorski's hopes for pushing back the USSR were pipedreams and that he must consider the necessity of cooperating with Stalin. Given this situation, he came up with a proposal for a Polish-Czechoslovak-Soviet pact, which in fact

meant relinquishing all thought of creating a confederation. Benes' position was influenced by Stalin's opposition. Stalin was bound to have been displeased with the notion of creating a confederation.

There was a dispute between Warsaw and Prague for three years after the end of World War II. During that time the Czechs demanded not only Zaolzie and Spisz but also the Klodzko, Raciborz, Glubczyce, and Kozielsk areas. At the culmination, on 10 June 1945, Czech armored units invaded the Raciborz Powiat. At Bierut's command, Polish armies stepped in to oppose them. After many more bloody encounters between the Polish militia and the Slovak partisans, and after a diplomatic struggle for the rights of the Polish minority in Czechoslovakia to be respected, peace and normalization came to the border region in 1947-48. It was also during this period that there were even renewed attempts to implement the idea of an economic confederation of the two countries. People even began to talk about a common currency and a mutually free tariff zone. In 1949 Stalin squelched these aspirations, not wanting any such cooperation that would be independent of Moscow.

Armies stood at Poland's southern borders on two other occasions. The first time, on 21 September 1968, Polish armies crossed the border in armed intervention at Brezhnev's instigation to crush the "Prague Spring." The Polish Army's role in the intervention was mostly symbolic, but the moral consequences are still evident today. The Czechs nearly had the same experience, when they stood at their border on 6 December 1981, ready for their own forces to invade Lower Silesia with 45,000 soldiers. Fortunately, on this occasion the border was not crossed.

Students on Czech Stereotypes

91EP0218B Poznan WPROST in Polish No 49,
9 Dec 90 p 24

[Article by Horoszkiewicz: "Stereotypes of Czechs"]

[Text] We asked Polish philology majors at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan what they imagine Czechs to be like. Here are some of the responses:

- The men are large-bellied beer drinkers. They're coarse. The women are overworked. The young girls remind you of shop displays in bad taste. Poorly made up, wearing cheap-looking jewelry. They're avid soccer fans. They adore dumplings. They can't stand Poles. They are chauvinists. For them, Czechs are paramount. They're very fond of imbecilic comedy. They enjoy needless confrontations with the Slovaks.
- They like beer and dumplings, which make them fat. They like serial programs like "Nemocnice na kraji mesta" [Hospital on the Outskirts of the City]. They drive Skodas. They like to go abroad for their vacations, to the seaside. They're loud and shout a lot. They don't like Poles and remind us about the misunderstandings over Cieszyn Silesia. I think of Czech girls as being smiling blondes with blue eyes.

- A Czech is a person with a great sense of humor, brimming over with jokes. Naive, hospitable, friendly, ready to help, genuine, direct.
- For me a Czech is the personification of animosity towards Poles. I think Czechs are very funny. I'm thinking about the language they speak. If I myself had to speak Czech, I'd burst out laughing every couple of minutes. I don't think I could eat dumplings three times a week. The Czechs do. Maybe they eat frugally so they can save up for a Skoda or a house in the country. I always associate Czechs with beer. They drink 100 liters at a time. Also related to Czechoslovakia are my prejudices about Czech films. They always have the same cast (because of a shortage of actors?) and the same stupid stories (which is the reason for the saying: "It's a Czech film; nobody knows anything)."

Leaders on Future Relations

91EP0218C Poznan WPROST in Polish No 49,
9 Dec 90 p 25-26

[Statements by Zdenek Chystil, Ilon Henkel, and Jan Jozef Lipski]

[Text]

Zdenek Chystil, Counsellor at the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic Embassy in Warsaw:

"We are interested in developing cooperation back and forth, but at the moment Czechoslovakia is going through a hard period introducing the reforms, which call for giving up a lot of things. Meanwhile, engraved in the minds of many of our citizens is the fear of being invaded by tourists from Poland, but I think that many of the problems will be satisfactorily resolved, as the reforms are implemented and prices become more realistic. The regulations on tourist traffic are certain to be liberalized soon, and the talks on the rate of exchange for Polish and Czechoslovak currency will become pointless, because the market will set the rate.

"The present difficulties in mutual talks concerning tourist traffic are the result not of any ill will on our part but of domestic problems, including the new division of jurisdiction between the federal government and the Czech and Slovak governments.

"The mass media should play an important role in breaking down the stereotypes on both sides. People in Poland are not always informed as to our difficulties, and in Czechoslovakia most of the mass media are operating according to an inferior, outmoded style. It's difficult to think about proper relations between our nations without breaking down this barrier."

Ilon Henkel, Employee in the Commercial Adviser's Office at the Czechoslovak Embassy:

"Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation is operating at a high level. The value of our trade has increased in years past, but at the present time, as Poland and Czechoslovakia

are changing over to a market economy, certain difficulties have become apparent. We can also expect the value of trade to drop as the result of the changeover to clearing in convertible currencies as of 1 January 1990. Despite this, I am optimistic, because we are already seeing many signs of great interest from companies, both government and private ones, concerning the possibility of engaging in cooperation. This is completely understandable, when we consider the traditions of our cooperation, that the geographic situation is favorable to the conduct of trade, and a certain complementarity between the Polish and Czechoslovak economies."

Jan Jozef Lipski, Head of the Polish Socialist Party and Cofounder of Polish-Czechoslovak Solidarity in 1987:

"I think our nations should cooperate as closely as possible, but the way history has gone, the Poles and the Czechs have taken turns acting stupidly. As it happens, this time the Czechs have behaved stupidly, but I don't attach much significance overall to all these disputes and conflicts."

Tyminski Party To Run in Parliamentary Elections

91P20181A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
2-3 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by Z.L.: "Tyminski: 'I Will Create a Party for a Second Poland'"]

[Text] "In the coming days I will appeal to society, that so-called second Poland, in order that it [society] shows itself to be [composed of] true Poles and that it organizes itself in such a manner as should have been done a long time ago," stated Stanislaw Tyminski, who on Thursday, 31 January, took part in the initial phase of bidding for the newspaper SZTANDAR MLODYCH.

This same former candidate for president confirmed that he is ready to form a political party in Poland. When asked what kind of character this organization would have, he said that has not yet been defined. "We'll leave this to its members to ultimately decide. This will be a Polish party, for Poles," asserted Tyminski, not hiding the fact that he is counting most on those who voted for him in the presidential elections. But not only on them, for, in the opinion of the author of "Holy Dogs," his electorate has recently broadened somewhat.

According to Tyminski, he himself will not run for a parliamentary deputy or Senate seat. His party, however, will definitely put up its own candidates in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

German Unification: Effects on Economy, Culture

91EP0216A Poznan WPROST in Polish No 49,
9 Dec 90 pp 36-37

[Discussion with Helga Hirsch, DIE ZEIT correspondent; Professor Hubert Orłowski, specialist on German

literature, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan; and POLITYKA journalists Jerzy Baczynski and Adam Krzeminski, led by Wacław Miziniak; place and date not given: "The Unification of Germany—A Threat or an Opportunity?: Will the German Wed Wanda?" [Translator's Note: This is an allusion to the legend of Princess Wanda of Krakow, who refused to marry the German Prince Rytgier and prevented a Polish-German war by hurling herself into the Vistula River.]]

[Text] [Miziniak] The events of recent months and weeks—the unification of Germany, the Polish-German peace treaty, and lastly the November summit meeting of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] in Paris—are requiring a new look at Polish-German relations. One consequence of the unification is that the boundary of the EEC has shifted toward the Odra River.

[Baczynski] Hence also we shall soon sense, or already are sensing, these consequences to our economy. The unification of Germany is both a threat and an opportunity to our economy. The threat is in the short run, while the opportunity is in the long run. There is no doubt that our economy is paying for that unification. It is paying by losing the GDR market to which was linked four or five percent of the volume of Poland's foreign trade along with more than 100 coproduction ties. Now the former GDR has revoked many contracts and is not accepting Polish goods. This is causing, in the short run, a threat to the existence of many Polish enterprises. Another problem is the reversal of trends in Polish-German trade. Thus while as recently as in midyear we had a surplus in our trade with the GDR, now that the German currency union has been introduced we have a trade deficit of more than 1.5 billion German marks [DM]. This deficit arose because, when unifying their currency, the Germans fixed a ruble-to-mark conversion rate which is clearly favoring German exports to CEMA countries and constitutes a major barrier to imports.

[Miziniak] They did it to save their enterprises, their economy.

[Baczynski] That is understandable. Being unable to sell its goods in its own country, the GDR economy had to stimulate their exports, chiefly to the former socialist countries. The unification of Germany has at the same time become a catalyst for the disintegration of CEMA. The Soviet Union has begun to convert to hard-currency dealings in its trade with our country, emulating the Polish-German trade dealings. This will cost us an additional \$1-2 billion.

[Miziniak] How awful! How depressing!

[Baczynski] Moreover EEC import barriers will begin to apply to our trade with Germany.

[Miziniak] What about the apprehensions that we may become to Germany a reservoir of cheap manpower, of cheap raw materials, or, simply, a waste dump?

[Baczynski] But we ourselves want very much to become a source of manpower. That will benefit our economy.

[Miziniak] That is, Poles would work across the border but spend here. But since the times when it was possible to live on \$30 a month in Poland are over, how do you account for the unusually great interest in learning the German language?

[Orlowski] I would answer this question with another: Are we mentally ready to face the unification of Germany? I do not think so. But a segment of the Polish public has rapidly caught on and begun to study the German language, though not as a "Kultursprache" [cultural language] but as a "Wirtschaftssprache" [economic language] or a "Geschaeftssprache" [business language]. And that segment, chiefly consisting of young Poles, which is estimated to number several hundred thousand persons, chiefly those living along the western border of Poland, has one aim: to profit from Germany or to do business with Germany.

[Miziniak] What about the majority who have no head for business?

[Orlowski] I feel apprehensive about the nontechnical intelligentsia. It is much worse off than the analogous social group on the other bank of the Odra. In the case of the French and German intelligentsia the point was to overcome, let us call them, stereotypes, but between economically equal partners. This does not apply to the relationship between the Polish and German intelligentsias, and will not apply for a long time yet. Teachers, journalists, artists, and culture personnel will for many years feel themselves to be poor relatives of their German colleagues. I think that in their case an authentic dialogue will not be reached soon, not even assuming familiarity with the German language (because after all we cannot demand of the Germans familiarity with Polish).

[Miziniak] The fears felt concerning Germany are confirmed by numerous polls. Last October's polls by the CBOS [Public Opinion Survey Center] indicate that a definite majority of Poles feel either fearful or threatened because of the unification of Germany.

[Hirsch] But my impression—and I have been living in Poland for a year—is that something is changing in the mentality of Poles, that we are overcoming the barrier of stereotypes in their thinking about Germans. The numerous contacts and trips to Germany, and recently also the Polish-German peace treaty will contribute, I hope, to undemonize the image of the German as the enemy in Polish public opinion, and to accept the new particular reality. That traditional view of Germany is a terrible obstacle to adapting to the new conditions.

[Miziniak] But in Germany Poles are among the most disliked nationalities.

[Hirsch] A similar situation will arise wherever the rich encounter the poor. Consider for example the Czechs who detain Romanians at their frontier.

[Miziniak] Is the unification of Germany an opportunity for Polish culture?

[Krzeminski] I believe that the three societies—Polish, East German, and West German—exist in a kind of culture shock whose ending date and outcome are unknown. Some prophesy that the unification of Germany will trigger a burgeoning of creative forces, a literary and cultural revival. But another, contrasting theory is that nothing like that will happen and the entire energy of both German societies will be focused on money grubbing, on equalizing economic potentials, while frustrations will be vented on the streets; now and then barricades will arise or cars set afire.

The situation is such that Europe is undergoing such rapid changes that we fearfully escape into the past. This has already happened once before in German history, toward the end of the 19th century, when the rapid economic and civilizational growth had intensified fears which were tentatively gratified by reverting to medieval myths. Besides, in this country too we are dealing with nationalist responses of this kind; a little more time and we shall seek salvation in Swiatowid [the Slavic god of war and harvest], because the Holy Virgin will not suffice us. The key to understanding the new situation is the natural weakening of the sense of identity of a society that has become accustomed to a different kind of reality and one differently described by culture.

[Miziniak] But it has been the material rather than the spiritual culture of Germany that attracts us.

[Krzeminski] Yes. We Poles are starting to face the problem of rationalizing our culture, underpinning our egos on success. This is possible but also terribly difficult, especially considering the decline in interest in the Polish cinema and literature.... By contrast, a novel trend is the discovery of the German material culture in the Western and Northern Polish Territories.

[Baczynski] That is where, at the same time, we observe the greatest interest—on both sides—in organizing joint ventures. I have already mentioned the short-term consequences of the unification of Germany as being generally unfavorable to the Polish economy. But the shift of the EEC boundary to the Odra-Nysa line will necessitate, owing to its proximity, German investments in Poland. Hence, I perceive the possibility that Polish trade will begin to count on the German market within a time frame of two to three years. The signs of a coming, small-investment boom in the border zone already are tangible.

[Orlowski] The unification of Germany and its economic consequences have, as I mentioned, resulted in a soaring interest in the German language.

[Hirsch] But while economic trends can be fairly objectively traced and assessed, this is not as easy so far as social awareness is concerned. As Mieczyslaw Pszon said, overcoming stereotypes requires profound changes in awareness; this requires a change in the image of the German as a greedy neighbor oriented toward exploiting short-term advantages. The Polish press increasingly often stresses the positive consequences of the unification of Germany, the bilateral advantages, Poland's return to Europe with the aid of Germany and Germans.

[Miziniak] Professor Wacław Wilczynski declared, concerning the discussion of the unification, "The unification of Germany is an opportunity to the strong and a threat to the weak." In view of your comments, this declaration seems debatable. But is that really so?

P.S. The above is an unauthorized record of the discussion.

German Minority Presents 'Disquieting' Demands

91EP0216B Poznan WPROST in Polish No 50,
16 Dec 90 pp 33-34

[Article by Jerzy Przylucki: "Nagorno-Karabakh in Silesia? Sixteen Demands of the German Minority: The German Minority Wants a Privileged Autonomy, Demands the Creation of the 'Free Territory of Silesia'"]

[Text] "Loyalty to the fatherland," recently declared Deputy Jerzy Wuttke, chairman of the Sejm's Commission for Nationalities and Ethnic Affairs, "is an obligation of every Polish citizen. It is difficult to accept the 16-point memorandum dispatched to the Polish and German governments by the Central Council of German Societies in the Republic of Poland. The demands contained in that document are disquieting and demonstrate that the German minority is under the influence of the Association of Expellees in Germany."

The deputy is right. Unfortunately, the memorandum of the Central Council is a step backward and a turnabout in the normalization of nationality relations in Silesia. It has turned out that lava does not cool at once, that from time to time it erupts. But the worst thing about it is that the source of the latest eruption was not Silesia but Bavaria, where last July the Central Council had been invited to a convention of the Association of Expellees. It was there, most likely, that it was handed those 16 points. Simply handed!

In Wuerzburg Secretary General of the BVD [Bayerisches Verein der Vertriebenen—Bavarian Association of Expellees] Hartmut Koschyk of a certainty decided to "shoot down" the second Secretary General of the Central Council, Dithmar Brehmer, from his post (he is president of the Main Board of the Upper Silesian Charitable Society in Katowice).

Brehmer, known for his loyalty to the Polish government, a superb organizer and a shining speaker, has at some moment become an impediment to Koschyk. His

individuality was too pronounced. To a BVD politician this is a flaw, a danger. Because Koschyk, starting from the Christian Democratic Union in Bavaria, is counting on Silesian votes to get elected to the Bundestag. Ultimately he does not want to share the glory with anyone.

But Brehmer warns, "If we as Germans begin to pursue a nationalistic policy, we will have a Nagorno-Karabakh, not an Upper Silesia!"

In Silesia much is being said about autonomy. It also is being mentioned by Katowice Voivode Wojciech Czech, and he is supported by the Upper Silesian Association. The German minority, too, mentions autonomy. But while everyone thus speaks of autonomy, everyone interprets it differently. The voivode wants Upper Silesia to become yet another of many autonomous regions of this country, along with Wielkopolska, Malopolska, Mazowsze, etc. The German minority, the one led by Hartmut Koschyk, desires a privileged autonomy, perhaps even not for the entire Silesia but for itself alone. Should these 16 demands be met, the Germans would effortlessly dominate economic and, subsequently, political life in Silesia. After all, the plebiscite proposed by Koschyk east of the Odra and Nysa rivers is nothing other than a presaging of the creation of the Free Territory of Silesia.

Let me cite Demand Number 2 in the abovementioned memorandum: "We demand our own fundamental statehood rights and rights distinguishing the German minority from the generality of the inhabitants of the Polish Republic."

And what is one to think of the demand: "We demand a prohibition against assimilation, not just in direct but also in indirect form, by means of economic, cultural, administrative, and social undertakings."?

But Upper Silesia shall remain Polish. Such also is the will of Bonn. The inviolability of the border on the Odra and Nysa was recently mentioned in Opole by FRG Ambassador to Poland Guenther Knackstedt. He acknowledged that many members of the German minority are embittered by the firm position of his government. But, he added, it cannot be otherwise. On the other hand, he avoided answering when asked about his opinion on dual citizenship for the German minority in Silesia.

Once every several weeks a lawyer, Robert Stuhr, comes from Germany to Gogolin to receive clients. Stuhr not only explains to them how to depart from Poland, but recently also he provides advice on how to remain a German and remain in Poland.

"I simply cannot conceive of a situation," this lawyer, who is not associated with the Association of Expellees, said, "in which 100,000 or 200,000 people will begin to live here on German identity documents. This would create huge problems for the federal government, also owing to considerations of international law."

Even now thousands of young autochthons are coming to Upper Silesia. If their parents receive German passports, this region will become binational.

The "hawks" from the DFK [Deutscher Freundschaftskreis—German Friendship Circle] already have green cards bearing the black eagle emblem and want to participate in this December's German elections. A majority of the Germans in Upper Silesia are filling out questionnaires for the Bundesverwaltungsamt [German Office of Administration].

One of the questions in those questionnaires is, "When did you leave Germany?"

"Never," is how many answer it.

Increased Anxiety Over Growing Number of Refugees

91EP0217A *Poznan WPROST in Polish No 49*,
9 Dec 90 pp 16-18

[Article by Piotr Gajdzinski: "Invasion: To Poland for Bread"]

[Text] We may expect an invasion of our country from the Soviet Union within the next weeks.

On seeing a camera in the waiting room of the Warsaw-East [railway] Station, women immediately pick up their bundles and leave the place with lightning speed. "Don't, don't!"

A man picks up a bottle and prepares to fight, others wave their arms and shout something at us.

"What are you doing? We're tourists," a young and exceptionally elegant young lady urgently protests and sharply advises us to point our cameras at the Poles, drunk to unconsciousness, who are peaceably sharing space with the Romanians.

An older woman, working at the station bar, believes that the "tourists" are not making any great trouble. She has not seen any "Ceausescu orphans" fighting or arguing, although she admits that they are not very eager to pay for meals. Neither has she heard that they are robbing Poles; quite the contrary, "It is our people that organize in small bands and take from them what they can. Those adolescents don't have consciences..."

There is a small cubicle with the proud designation: Currency Exchange Office. Exchange. Two well-dressed men frown at my question. "They don't visit us. Only sometimes, in the evening, they change dollars or a few lei. Small sums that let them buy tea or a sandwich downstairs in the bar."

Among the permanent inhabitants of the station who came from Romania, it is easy to see two castes. The poorest sit in the waiting room, spread their food on the bare seats, and gesticulate in a lively manner. Children

run between the benches and shyly tilt their heads toward the corridor. The air reeks of bodies that have not bathed for many days.

It is otherwise downstairs. In the station hall, Romanian financial potentates argue fiercely with our operators over every zloty. The Pole, resigned, waves his hand, the bundle of bills changes owners, and satisfaction appears on the face of the "operator." He turns down attempts at conversation, obviously anonymous, with: "Go to hell."

The Romanians cross our boundaries legally. On the basis of an agreement dating back to the Polish Peoples Republic, they are allowed to travel to our country without a visa, but they may not remain in the country more than 90 days. They must leave the country after that period.

"I always see the same faces, especially the women and children. If they leave, it is only for a day or two to deliver the money they earned and to return," says a station official of the Police Detachment. "Most often they use our trains without buying tickets. The conductors are afraid to check on them, there have already been a good number of incidents of beatings.

Immigrants in Poland

Ethiopians	169
Lebanese	114
Palestinians	48
Angolans	46
Albanians	45
Iraqis	40
Somalis	38
Syrians	30
Iranians	29
Romanians	28
Turks	24
USSR citizens	11
Kuwaitis	7
Afghans	4
Bangladeshis	2
Sri Lankans	2
Libyans	1
Senegalese	1

Wieslaw Paluszynski, deputy press spokesperson of the Ministry for Internal Affairs, explains that at the moment immigrants are not a problem in Poland. This year, we spent 7.5 billion zloty on them, which is not an impressive sum on a nationwide scale. "I am afraid that the problem will become more severe. And that, on a scale that will threaten the Polish economy."

The spread of incidents in the Soviet Union is observed with fear on Rakowiecka [Street]. What is of concern is

not only the political situation, but primarily, living conditions, supplies in the stores.

"There may be several scenarios. It may come to a coup d'etat in the Soviet Union and something like our Military Council for National Salvation may seize power," said Lt. Col. Zbigniew Skoczylas, Ministry for Internal Affairs plenipotentiary for refugee matters, "and meanwhile, several thousand Russians arrive in Poland daily and ask for asylum, fearing repression. If the Soviet Army closes its western border, we will be able to manage the problem."

However, Lt. Col. Skoczylas fears a different development of the situation in the USSR: empty shelves, a hard winter, and starving people for whom the only salvation may be the route their grandparents took in 1918-20 when several hundred thousand fled from communism onto Polish lands. In the Ministry of Internal Affairs there is great fear that this time we will be offering hospitality to several million people faced with starvation. And the Polish economy will certainly not withstand that.

The professionals in the Ministry of Internal Affairs fear the poorest residents of Byelorussia most of all because in the Ukraine, activities have already begun that should at least partially alleviate the situation. Poland's eastern border is completely open, not only are mechanized units lacking there, but also border guards and larger police units. Moreover, it is likely that no forces will stop the waves of refugees.

Lt. Col. Skoczylas is convinced that the real question, at all turning points in Polish history, of will they enter or not has assumed a new meaning. Now we do not have to fear the Soviet Army, but masses of hungry and freezing people.

And we cannot count on help from the UN.

Wieslaw Paluszynski does not have any great hopes. All information indicates that the pressure is growing beyond the Bug River, and the ever-spreading conviction is that the people will not be able to heat their houses and that basic food items will be lacking. That will bring a flood that no one will hold back because we will certainly not give a command to fire at defenseless people.

It is difficult to pass through the center of Warsaw without meeting Romanian women in rags, with children wrapped in blankets, with a cardboard sign: "I am a Romanian. I have five children who are dying of hunger."

"I must give a few pennies," says an older woman. "I won't get poorer and perhaps I'll save someone's life? They have certainly suffered a lot."

An employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs is of a different opinion: "During a single day of begging at a good spot, the Romanians get as much as three to four times a monthly pension. They exchange zlotys for leis,

go to their country and return immediately. Frequently even infants haggle among themselves."

One of the Romanian women who fled from a camera dropped a bundle of banknotes from beneath her skirt.

The police believe that the worst still lies ahead. At present, the "tourists" from the south are peaceful, but winter may change the situation entirely. According to estimates of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there are approximately 20,000-30,000 Romanians in Poland; in the winter, significantly more may come. Not all of them will manage to support themselves by unlicensed trade and begging. Then crimes, theft, and robbery will increase.

Our public safety forces are not prepared for this, they can't even manage local criminality. The authorities are not ready to send consecutive patrols into the streets, and what will happen if, in addition to the Romanians, we receive masses of refugees from the East into Poland? The budget is stressed, money and special service centers are lacking. The Ministry of Internal Affairs is looking for barracks that the army is vacating, but at present only one suitable complex has been located and adapting it will require several billion zlotys. Lt. Col. Skoczylas also fears animosity on the part of the Poles and, for this reason, the buildings must be located at a distance from settlements.

Refugee Camps in Poland

Location	Number of Persons
Serock	132
Swidry Wielkie	101
Jachranka	81
Debe	79
Modlin	66
Rynie	59
Rudce	36
Zegrze	24

Waves of Immigration Into Poland

Russians (1918-20)	Several hundred thousand
Greeks (1948)	Several hundred thousand
Germans from GDR (1989)	Several thousand
Czechs and Slovaks (1989)	2,000-3,000
Africans (1980's)	Several hundred
Arabs (1980's)	Several hundred

Preparations are continuing. We must hurry for "midnight will strike" soon.

Frosty, evening air. A woman lies on the floor and shows the face of a small frozen child. I toss 500 zlotys and immediately children appear before me. They run with outstretched arms and cry, "Friend, friend."

Helsinki Committee's Request to Attorney General

91EP0219A Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish
27 Dec 90 p 11

[Signed statement by members of the Helsinki Committee in Poland protesting discrimination against AIDS victims and anti-Semitism]

[Text] Several times this year instances of forced expulsion of HIV carriers from their domiciles, owing to an aggressive collective action of neighborhood dwellers, have taken place.

Last November, in Rybierek near Wyszkw, HIV carriers were given a few minutes to depart from their halfway house. Threats and violence were resorted to.

Several months earlier, in Gloskow, local inhabitants organized a road blockade in order to force the HIV carriers living at the local MONAR [Young People's Movement To Combat Drug Addiction] center to leave that locality. Similar events took place in Konstancin and Kaweczyn.

At the same time, individual instances of intolerance and discrimination against HIV carriers are multiplying, such as preventing them from shopping in their neighborhoods, refusing them urgent medical help, and harassing them at their workplaces.

We consider such actions to be in the nature of crimes defined as resorting to duress or lawless threats in order to force an individual to conform to a particular mode of conduct (Article 167, Criminal Code), invasion of privacy (Article 171, Criminal Code), violation of bodily inviolability (Article 162, Criminal Code), and participation in a public riot whose participants jointly assault an individual (Article 275, Criminal Penal Code).

Considerations of public interest require a resolute response to behavior of this kind. We believe that the prosecutor's office should take energetic steps to protect the wronged individuals.

For some time now, publications vilifying and deriding persons of Jewish origin and calling for quarrels between Poles and Jews have become widespread in Poland. This may be exemplified by the books "Judeopolonia" [Jewish Polonia], "Zydzi w Polsce" [The Jews in Poland], or "The Protocols of the Sages of Zion." Also being distributed are flyers of an antisemitic nature, such as the flyer, disseminated since last October, "Who Rules Poland and Who Protects the Rulers," signed by the Committee for Investigating Jewish Crimes. Such materials are distributed, e.g., in Warsaw on Jerozolimskie Avenue, on Bracka Street, and near the entrance gate of the University of Warsaw.

The printing and dissemination of such publications exhibits, we believe, the distinguishing marks of the

crimes referred to in Article 273 in connection with Article 272 of the Criminal Code as well as in Article 274, Paragraph 1, of the Criminal Code.

It is our belief that you, Sir, as the Attorney General of the Republic of Poland, shall take appropriate legal steps in connection with these deeds.

Marek A. Nowicki
Danuta Przywara
Lech Falandysz
Wanda Falkowska
Zofia Wasilkowska
Halina Bortnowska-Dabrowska
Wojciech Maziarski
Andrzej Rzeplinski
Marek Nowicki
Jan Rosner
Marek Edelman
Maria Dziedzic
Jacek Kurczewski
Janina Zakrzewska

Ambassador to Israel on Travel, Cultural Contacts
91EP0214A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
2 Jan 91 p 7

[Interview with Professor Jan Dowgiallo, first ambassador of the Republic of Poland to Israel, by Mieczyslaw Szytcer in Tel Aviv; date not given: "On Jewish-Polish Enmity and Friendship"]

[Text] [Szytcer] Is Israel your first diplomatic post?

[Dowgiallo] Precisely. I am not a professional diplomat but rather a scientist, a geologist by education. I was born in Wolyn in 1932. I attended college in Wroclaw, and defended my thesis and dissertation at the University of Warsaw. Subsequently I worked at the PAN [Polish Academy of Sciences] Institute of Geological Sciences at which I am a professor and chief of a separate office of hydrogeology, that is, a science on subsurface waters; currently, I am on loan. I worked as a UN expert in this field in India and South Yemen. I head the Commission of Mineral and Thermal Waters in the International Association of Hydrogeologists.

[Szytcer] Apart from your scientific career, you also found time for a political career.

[Dowgiallo] Quite a long one at that, spanning 10 years. I have been a Solidarity member since its inception in 1980. I was chairman of the Resolutions and Motions Commission at both of its national congresses and chairman of the Solidarity Coordinating Commission in the PAN.

[Szytcer] You have arrived at a [diplomatic] post in a country with which the communist People's Republic of Poland severed relations 23 years ago. You are now the first ambassador here of the truly free Republic of

Poland. This pioneering situation imposes various obligations on you, as well as makes you free to pursue numerous initiatives.

[Dowgiallo] Taking into account the ties of Jews to Poland over many centuries, I am fully aware of the responsibility devolving on me—to blunt the sharp edge of Polish-Jewish controversies and mitigate irritations which have piled up in the course of the common history of the two peoples, hampering rapprochement, cooperation, and friendship at present, when the Jews have their own state.

[Szytcer] You will certainly also encounter considerable difficulties when you attempt to influence certain unfriendly sentiments and attitudes of a segment of Israeli society toward Poland, for example, countering charges that Poland continues to be a monolith of ingrained anti-Semitism, and that, if we were to repeat a well-worn saying, every Pole "has drunk anti-Semitism in with his mother's milk." On the other hand, you will have to work to change a similarly hostile stance of a segment of Polish society toward the Jews.

[Dowgiallo] My government and I by no means conceal the fact that anti-Semitism continues to exist in Poland. At the same time, we know that anti-Polonism—let us call it that—exists in Israel, frequently on the high rungs of the local social ladder. Recently, I took part in a moving ceremony conferring the distinction of the Righteous Among the Peoples of the World on two dozen Poles. Deputy Chairman of the Knesset Prof. Shevah Weiss was among the speakers; several weeks ago, he not only sharply condemned the use of anti-Semitism as an argument in the presidential election campaign in an open letter to Lech Walesa, but also accused the entire Polish people of being hostile to the Jews. This time, when he spoke at this ceremony at the Yad Vashem Memorial Institute of the Jewish Holocaust, he looked in my direction. As if addressing President Walesa in this manner through me, he proposed to strike out old scores comprehensively. He said: "Let us close the matter of this letter. Let us try to resolve misunderstandings on the basis of a dialogue. Let us look toward the future. Let us stop living in the past." I perceived this gesture, this hand held out for accord, as correct and constructive. I responded to Professor Weiss in the same spirit of reconciliation. In the same tone, I informed my authorities in Warsaw about his speech.

[Szytcer] It appears to me that many misunderstandings are due to mutual unfamiliarity.

[Dowgiallo] It is indeed so. Mutual familiarization may convince the Poles that the Jews, taken together, are not our enemies, and that Poles, taken together, are not anti-Semitic; that the enlightened, progressive strata of our societies amount to a considerable majority on both sides of the dialogue.

[Szytcer] However, over time all emotional stereotypes become so ossified that they will not be crushed.

[Dowgiallo] This may be the case, and then only in part, with regard to the older generations of the two peoples. However, as far as young people born in the two to three decades after the war are concerned, we have a great opportunity to succeed. Let young Jews travel to Poland, and young Poles travel to Israel. They will quickly find out how similar their tastes, attire, entertainment, sports, music and dance, work, and study are. The hostile emotions of previous generations are the past that will never return to them. This is why it is important that the excursions of Jewish youths to Poland did not follow only the path of martyrdom of their ancestors. It is also important for Poland to become, in their perception, not a country of only death camps but a country of people who are the same as all others in the world. There should be some allowance of time made for regular tourist impressions in the program of youth excursions to Poland compiled by the Israeli Ministry of Education and Culture.

[Szytcer] Cultural contacts usually accompany youth exchanges. How will these contacts develop?

[Dowgiallo] Agreements on cultural exchanges are now being initialed. A tourist agreement will be signed in early 1991. Agreements on setting up a center of Polish culture in Israel and a center of Israeli culture in Poland are being prepared. We count on the rapid development of scientific cooperation. An agreement between the academies of science of the two countries has already been signed. In January, work will be completed on a draft of a trilateral Israeli-Polish-Jewish foundation, that is, also with the participation of diaspora Jews. It is engaged in restoring the monuments of culture of Polish Jews and their cemeteries.

[Szytcer] Thank you for the conversation.

ROMANIA

Controversial Minister Plesu Interviewed

91BA0262A Bucharest "22" in Romanian 11 Jan 91
pp 10-11

[Interview with Culture Minister Andrei Plesu by Gabriela Adamesteanu on 5 January 1991; place not given]

[Text] [Adamesteanu] What do you think were the consequences of your resignation?

[Plesu] I think it will have positive consequences. The entire meeting took eight hours. The first item on the agenda, which was not as technical as it may have seemed from the televised communique, was a speech by the prime minister marking the beginning of the new year: It was one of the harshest analyses of government activities that I've heard all year. It went as far as to say that if we don't manage to unblock (by unwavering determination and most rigorous actions) what currently appears to be blocked at all the levels of the national economy and development, it will be more honest for the

government to resign in its entirety. The survival of old structures and people (especially in the control and decisionmaking apparatus of the economy) was discussed, as was the fact that this apparatus operates not unlike a tacit conspiracy against any attempt at reform. It was noted that operational flaws exist within the government and that government members risk not thinking their actions in political terms. In short, at one point I felt that everything I wanted to bring up through my resignation had in a way been anticipated by the prime minister's very virulent speech, a speech that created the kind of mood inside the government that cannot fail to have consequences. The need for regular and exhaustive discussions on issues of general strategy and principle of government policies was accepted. We suggested topics for governmental discussions that will be seriously tackled in the immediate future: The relations between the authorities and intellectuals, the mood in the country, our foreign policy, and the issue of credibility. Because until now (as one of the ministers noted at one point) the only thing we have done has been to practice a sort of legislative hemorrhage instead of tackling extremely urgent and very important questions for the dialogue between the government and the people. The discussion around my resignation stirred a very noncomplacent analysis of certain government operational flaws and I am convinced that once things are said the chance of their being repeated is much smaller. Both the fact that Mr. Baltazar was compelled to accept that the viewpoint expressed in the radio communique was not the viewpoint of the entire government team and the Foreign Ministry's initiative to suggest to the king a clarification of his citizenship status, so that he shouldn't need a visa every time he comes here, seem to me to be tangible results. As far as I am concerned, I think that a swifter and handier procedure would have been to abrogate the decree under which he was stripped of his citizenship, which was passed by a definitely not honorable or credible government. I think, however, that if the king wants to visit his country he will accept this suggestion just as he accepted the alternative under which he came.

[Adamesteanu] Was the prime minister's unexpectedly "virulent" speech triggered by your resignation which was to be discussed as the second point [of the agenda]?

[Plesu] I cannot pass judgment on the prime minister's speech, analyze its genesis, or advance assumptions about his strategy. But at a certain point I had a feeling that some of the problems opened up by my resignation were present in the underground [last word in English] in some parts of his speech. Which as a matter of fact is something I said at the meeting. I said that I had the bitter satisfaction of noting an extraordinary coherence between my resignation and the discussion on the first point; whereas I had expected my resignation to cause some kind of break in the meeting, it actually came on the heels of a first point that I had not anticipated.

[Adamesteanu] What was the degree of participation of your other colleagues in your intervention?

[Plesu] I had a first meeting with some of them on Wednesday 26 December, the day after the event, at Minister Stoica's. There were about ten ministers there and, on the basis of the information we had at that time, I thought I found absolute unanimity in our discussion: Everyone agreed that my viewpoint was legitimate and that indeed the solution adopted about the king's visit was not at all inspired. Not all of my colleagues there had the time to take the floor at yesterday's session, nevertheless I felt a stir of sympathy that pleased me and made me feel that I was not entirely isolated in my action. For example, Mr. Severin had an almost identical opinion about Mr. Baltazar's communique (which in fact I think he published in *CURIERUL NATIONAL*). Also, Mr. Stanculescu, in an interview for Radio Free Europe, said he did not feel bound by Mr. Baltazar's communique, which he thought was of a strictly private nature. On that occasion I also felt that Mr. Minister Tugulea, who spoke very wisely, was also on my side.

[Adamesteanu] How extensive was this failure to consult the government?

[Plesu] It was fairly massive. In this particular case, aside from Interior Minister Ursu, I don't think that any other minister had been involved in the decision; in point of fact, Mr. Ursu even said something along this line in Parliament. In the evening of 25 December when I heard the Interior Ministry's communique, I felt the danger that the "royal episode" may be dramatized in a most unfortunate manner. I wanted immediately to get in touch with someone in the government leadership. I called Minister Ursu but I didn't get a hold of him and couldn't find out who was acting for him. I called the president at home, didn't get hold of him. I called the prime minister, didn't get a hold of him. That evening I had a sensation of panic because the country seemed to have been left in suspension; in such an emergency I, a minister, was not able to quickly get in touch with my colleagues and superiors. In other words, if I wanted to report that the Free Press building was on fire or some other very serious event in my area, I had no means of doing so. I found that these were all dysfunctions, that it was a crisis of communication inside the government.

[Adamesteanu] In that event, some of the arguments for your resignation lost their point. Can you now list the points that caused you to resign?

[Plesu] I resigned for the following reasons: First of all there was the realization that decisions were being made in the name of the government without consulting all its members. Secondly there was the realization that communiques were being issued on behalf of the government without the government being consulted. The same went for the contents of those communiques. As a last point I discussed the issue of the monarchy itself and established that the government had never taken a clear position on that matter, that we couldn't dismiss it in terms of a mediocre antimonarchist history, and that the legitimacy of the 30 December 1947 episode was not exactly implied, stating that although I thought that at this point

the monarchy did not have supporters in Romania, the issue in principle cannot be dismissed in polemical and superficial terms; consequently, the government would do well to hold a serious discussion on the issue, so that we can be prepared should such situations emerge. Because we were completely unprepared from the viewpoint of having a doctrine. That was the sequence of my resignation. At the last point I said that I had also been hurt by the disproportion between the indecision of the authorities and phenomena that to me, viewed from my angle, seem essential. For example: The campaign staged in AZI against the Ministry of Culture, to which there was no reaction whatsoever; the Brancusi scandal in Parliament to which there was no reaction; the intolerable behavior of Romania Mare, to which there was no reaction; the presence of I.C. Dragăn in Romanian media, to which there was no reaction. And here all of a sudden was an almost neurotic reaction (I said in my resignation) to the arrival of Michael von Hohenzollern. In those conditions, I added there, I did not consider making grand gestures about any of those episodes because I didn't think that we should add chaos to chaos and resentment to resentment, but this was already too much, this was the point at which a gesture such as resignation seemed unavoidable.

[Adamesteanu] Did you encounter opposition to your views in the government?

[Plesu] At some point it was claimed that my resignation was precariously argued from a legal viewpoint and that it actually had no point. I cannot guarantee that legally my text was perfectly formulated (because I'm not an expert in the area); it was the outcome of an attitude, not of a well perfected ideology or of legal competence. That is why I thought that Mr. Baltazar's declaration was important, namely the fact that his radio communique did not represent the government's viewpoint because there was so much talk of unity and solidarity in the government team. And in a government team unity and solidarity must not be of a disciplinary order but attained through discussion. By definition the political domain is a community domain, not one in which individuals decide all by themselves.

There is something I'd like to say about some of the reactions elicited by my gesture among various circles and about the impact it had on me. Because this is a matter that raises questions about the political mentality of the entire people and all the political groups. Currently there are too many scenarios in Romania. The government (i.e., the authorities) has its scenarios and there is talk of opposition scenarios. In its turn, the opposition is continually generating scenarios and almost every individual has his own scenario. That is why our political thinking is very schematic. This kind of thinking in abstract schemes that elude tangible realities and the human realities it concerns is very communist in nature. Ceausescu thought in diagrams, he didn't think in terms of real data and human material but in principles and global strategies. Ceausescu's thinking was very abstract. In a way Ceausescu was a metaphysic. And we show a

tendency to stay with that metaphysic tradition. As soon as a person or a reality doesn't fit our scenario, we become indignant and get mad at people or realities for not fitting our scheme, instead of correcting the diagram.

After I resigned I felt (especially on the part of the opposition or let's say, of apolitical pressure groups, as they are called) a succession of attitudes that reflected their views of my place in the scenario. At some point I suddenly became liked simply because I had resigned from the government. All of a sudden I was getting phone calls from opponents who hadn't called me in a long time. Later, because I didn't jump straight from the government to holding a meeting in some square and didn't express solidarity with some group or political association, I disappointed people and there was a groan of dissatisfaction. A sort of sad deflation. It was as if I had been on the point of waking up but I fell asleep again. In point of fact, the idea that for a whole year I had been sleeping and that in the end I had a short moment of clarity is in itself insulting. It means that all this time I was stupid, until somebody (or something) scratched at my grey matter. The fact that I withdrew my resignation will elicit the same reactions, irritation, and disappointment because we continue to think in diagrams. If we don't stick to realities and become involved in shaping them, all we will be doing will be a new quarrel among general principles. The government and especially the governmental press are still angry with me. I already saw an attack in yesterday's AZI, which claimed that what I said about revolution on television (namely that revolutions are abnormal states and that one could not live in a state of permanent revolution) was referring strictly to 22 December and consequently that I had allegedly said that the December revolution was an anomaly! That was how AZI interpreted it.

I want to take advantage of this opportunity to state that given the inflation of Christian spirit in our media, it should include the idea that a true Christian does not sit in judgment. Christianity is not a religion that "cuts babies in half," as my friend Petru Cretia once said. A real Christian is a man who understands, who doesn't throw stones, who has patience, and who is tolerant. However, none of those qualities are currently circulated in the Romanian press, except for Christianity itself. There is something unchristian in the impatience and hystery into which we at times allow ourselves to be dragged, and the idea of quickly judging and classifying people is a counterproductive idea.

[Adamesteanu] You replaced 80 percent of the personnel of the Ministry of Culture. What was the reaction of your new colleagues—some of whom are artists of prestige—to your resignation?

[Plesu] Some of my most important colleagues thought that my attitude was more important than its possible negative consequences. On the other hand, there were many (also in my circle) who up to the last minute tried to dissuade me from resigning. The actual ministry personnel did not make me feel (with a few exceptions)

that they agreed with the idea of my resignation. The intellectuals split into two camps: The moderates were against the resignation, while the radicals were in favor—but even they has some doubts at times. I myself pondered (as responsibly as I could) the problem of the relation between the significance of the gesture and its possible consequences. People whose presence in the Romanian cultural scene whose opinions I value very much (Mr. Lucian Pintilie, to cite just one example) told me that if my resignation was accepted they would quit their positions. A few other similar declarations sent me into a great state of tension; I told myself that if indeed my gesture was affecting, so to speak, the object of my work, if everything that was done (as much as could be done) this year risked disappearing because of this gesture, if important people who agreed to go back to work in Romania were considering abandoning it, then my responsibility was becoming far heavier. I would lie if I said that this consideration was not at work in my mind throughout these days, that I didn't wonder what was more important, a topical attitude or a long-term attitude. Mr. Noica always had great reservations about pure gestures. He used to say: "One runs the risk of being a one-gesture person." In other words, all that would be said after my death would be, "This is the guy who resigned from the Romanian Government." Mr. Noica was of the opinion that it was a poor performance for a whole lifetime, however dignified. Governments are very transient things and they are almost secondary (although at the immediate time my gesture may appear very important for the actual workings of a government team). What is lasting is precisely Lucian Pintilie and generally everything that is being achieved in the cultural area. No gesture is lofty enough to justify jeopardizing what is being done in the cultural area! Of course, that doesn't mean that one should be open to every compromise and not voice one's viewpoint. However, one should do so after the most careful consideration and with the idea of improving the situation, not with the idea of a war that can bring more bloodshed than real results. This is my conviction. That is why throughout the meeting I was willing to discuss the terms of my resignation—a conditional resignation. And that is why I was willing to withdraw it when I felt that its elements had been sufficiently satisfied. I cannot guarantee the absolute purity of my gestures, neither of the resignation nor of its withdrawal, but I can guarantee that at each moment I acted in keeping with a personal line of thought that had its own consistency.

[Adamesteanu] Was your resignation connected only to the fact that the government hadn't been consulted, was it linked only to the form or also to the substance of that circumstance?

[Plesu] I thought that what was involved was procedural flaws, the fact that the government wasn't consulted, that it was implicated in a communique to which it had not agreed, and that the procedure used was not a felicitous one. In my resignation I did not discuss much the substance of the thing itself, because the subject of my

resignation (and this is something that matters to me) was not a political belief of one kind or another. I did not mean to imply through my resignation that I wanted a monarchy. This is not my decision and my opinion on this does not matter. This is a question on which the Romanian people must decide through a legal procedure that will have to take place at some point. Consequently, my resignation was procedural, technical, as I said at one point, with the observation that a technical issue is nevertheless a political issue when it concerns a government because it reflects on the credibility and effectiveness of the government in question. Technically, of course, I have reservations about the type of solution adopted (even if the Interior Ministry claimed that it had legal reasons to proceed as it did). However, I would say that they were legitimate from the viewpoint of the Interior Ministry but wrong from a political viewpoint. What happened here may be said to have been legal correct but it was not politically correct. In other words, the bet was staked on punctiliousness (to use a philosophical expression) rather than on truth. In point of fact, what was claimed here all the time was the letter of an article of law, the exactness of a regular behavior. Except that I perceived a truth that goes beyond the confines of exactness and that we must face.

[Adamesteanu] Do you think that a government spokesman who does not represent government opinion in its entirety can continue as its spokesman?

[Plesu] At yesterday's meeting we did discuss Mr. Baltazar's status as spokesman; it was said that his tone is sometimes too brutal, that his own personality shows through too much, whereas a spokesman must be nothing but a mere echo of government views. A spokesman is a specialist in variations on a given theme. He must not insert his own themes in his communique. Mr. Baltazar claimed that he was a state secretary, too, and as such he could have personal opinions. Except that he must take into account the fact that when his face is seen on the screen no one thinks he's speaking on his own behalf, everyone identifies him with the government, so everything he communicates, down to the last nuance, is very important. Of course, considering his makeup and temperament, I don't think that Mr. Baltazar is the best man for the position he currently holds; this is something I said at the meeting, too. After this episode I now inevitably feel constant anxiety every time I know that what will be discussed at government meetings will be reported to the public by Mr. Baltazar. On the other hand, I am convinced that he, too, has realized that his responsibilities are far greater than he may have thought.

[Adamesteanu] What were your thoughts on hearing last night's communique?

[Plesu] I must say that when I listened to him last night I realized that he was giving a terse, dry report (a somewhat anesthetized version) of what occurred at the meeting. Of course, a communique cannot be an epic, a short story giving a detailed account of the drama of a

meeting; it has to be firmer and shorter. I also admit that during the meeting Mr. Baltazar showed me the text and I asked a few questions about its contents, but after seven to eight hours of debate I was not sufficiently alert. Not because the communique essentially contained anything that was not in line with the reality, but because its wording left room...

[Adamesteanu] ...for a sense of dissatisfaction.

[Plesu] A sense of dissatisfaction that immediately emerged both in phone calls and comments by many people around me. There was even a feeling (according to what some people told me) that I had in a way corrected myself, that I withdrew my resignation having realized that I had no reason to resign. The communique left a rather unclear impression, for which, however, I hold myself responsible, too, because I had seen the communique before it was sent to the press agencies. At the same time, its interpretation also reveals a form of lack of political culture: People imagine that a withdrawn resignation is an unfounded resignation. When a resignation is no longer called for because it was satisfied one cannot say that "the resignation was turned down," but that "the resignation was withdrawn." However (in view of our lack of political experience) the idea of a withdrawn resignation is to us the idea of a cancelled resignation, a resignation that has lost its legitimacy. Which was not the case. Similarly, the suggestion concerning the king's Romanian citizenship was of course not reproduced in the wording I proposed in the draft for the communique (not to talk of regaining, but of confirming his citizenship). The term "regain" was chosen and things were once again given a coloring that did not coincide with my precise intention. But after all, this time I must be flexible and state that the communique does not represent my viewpoint but the viewpoint of the executive plenum and as such I cannot amend it.

[Adamesteanu] One of the obstacles into which Culture Ministry institutions ran was the paper shortage. Is it true, as is being said, that during this time the government has been exporting the paper we lack for our books?

[Plesu] I have inquired and found out that indeed, paper is still being exported under export contracts signed prior to 1990. The loss of money that would be incurred by not honoring those contracts would be greater than the actual loss of paper. But the paper shortage cannot be explained only by the fact that a given amount is exported; there is also the enormous market demand for paper and the decision taken to stop cutting down woods. The controversial question of woods was raised at at least two or three government meetings; on the one side there were requests to cut trees and on the other (the Environmental Ministry), pleas for conservation.

Now, of course, what will occur in the cultural area from now on is very tough, because of the lack (if you'll forgive the expression) of material resources! Our financial situation is very bad. Naturally, everyone says to me, and

justly so: "Look, culture is like bread," which is profoundly true; my observation, however, is that we don't have bread either. So if the bread situation is bad, the cultural situation must inevitably be bad, to stay with the parallel. What we have already attained, which I think is important, is a decision by the prime minister to allocate a money fund for research, out of which we will be able to get the necessary funds to rescue written culture. So the Cultural Ministry's proposal to save written culture by means of a subsidy of a few hundreds millions lei, was granted. I would like to give another detailed explanation on this topic. We keep shouting "down with communism," but if we are not a bit "communists..." we no longer subsidize bankrupt institutions. When the Romanian Opera gives Swan Lake there are more people on stage than in the audience. In a market economy such an institution disappears. We cannot afford not to have an opera. We will have to continue making subsidy efforts and we found a solution for written culture. I have a feeling that we are also solving the museum problem. I am very worried about the problem of theaters. The cost of a show has risen very much because of the price liberalization (from materials to manpower); the subsidies we were awarding until now automatically become insufficient. Only if a theater ticket were to cost, I don't know, 200 lei... In many Western countries subsidized theaters can be counted on the fingers of both hands while the rest are self-financed companies that procure their own resources. We should take into consideration how much imagination we now use to procure money without having recourse to state resources. A profiteer uses his imagination massively and very effectively to make money. I get a bit melancholy seeing the campaign against profiteers. Of course profiteers are morally or legally questionable but they do have one quality that should be generalized: Making money in an environment in which constraints and obstacles predominate. It is very important that we stress this kind of financial imagination. Without it we won't be able to get out of the impasse. I would like sometime to write something or to come out on television about the blocks that communism fostered in us: lack of initiative and the habit of delegating responsibility and initiative to others—the state or the government. No theater director every thinks about ways to make money, the first impulse is to demand the minister's resignation.

5 January 1991

Brucan: 'Terrorists' Former Securitate Cadres
91BA0250A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
21 Dec 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Silviu Brucan by Sergiu Andon; place and date not given]

[Text] A strange thing, the commemoration of an event like the Revolution that pulled us out of a hibernation akin to national death. Sighs mingle with smiles, the smell of flowers with that of burning candles, pride with hatred, hope with revenge, peace with anxiety, and

pessimism with optimism. Both instinct and reason tell us that we achieved something important, decisive for our historical survival. In reality no one doubts the opportuneness of the explosion that occurred on Romanian soil one year ago, but equally real is the fact that there is probably no one who can recall the events without tensing up.

One of the many factors that complicated the events and raised doubts about one or another of their facets was the dramatic, torturous, and obsessive dilemma of the men who shot from the shadows and were instrumental in the bloodshed. Various answers and hypotheses were formulated in the past year, some likely, some peculiar, some that minimized, and some that inflated the role of the terrorists. We have to confess that none of them convinced us definitively. Hoping that at least now, one year later, the mystery may be dispelled, we had a talk with one of the most clear-sighted experts and commentators on Romanian political developments and on the events of the revolution, Mr. Silviu Brucan. Already on 16 January 1990 he formulated in ADEVARUL the most authoritative and at the time credible hypothesis on the authors of the anonymous attacks.

[Andon] You remember, Professor, the hypothesis that the terrorists were cadres of the former securitate?

[Brucan] I still claim it and I can support it by means of a still unpublished document.

[Andon] When and how did you acquire that conviction?

[Brucan] By the morning of Sunday 24 December the military situation had become truly critical. [Romania] Television, other strategic objectives, and major buildings were under attack by individuals very well trained for the purpose. Those were people who understood the importance of the buildings in question, had modern weapons, means of radio communication, and civilian and military means of transportation. On Saturday I was amazed to find out that in addition to General Guse, the military operation in Bucharest was overseen by General Iulian Vlad, the head of the Security Department. I was positive that the latter knew about the actions of the terrorists. I had met Gen. Vlad during the securitate investigation against me (twice he had come to the questioning office) and I knew that he was particularly intelligent and skillful. As I said before, he was at least one head and shoulders above his colleagues from the viewpoint of intelligence, culture, and cunning. That he should play a double game seemed to me perfectly in keeping with his logic. That is why I requested a confrontation with him before the members of the War Council; the confrontation took place at the National Defense Ministry in the evening of Sunday 24 December.

[Andon] What did it consist of?

[Brucan] Iulian Vlad had previously read a statement on radio and television. I had personally inserted in the text an explicit order to Vlad's men to stop the fire and

surrender to the army. I asked him why he omitted reading that passage. He said that the passage was unsuitable because his was a political statement, while the order to hold the fire had been issued before. Then I went to the second question in which, listing the complexity of the actions, sites, and means used by the terrorists, I concluded that it was impossible that they hadn't been established under a plan for urban guerilla-type military operations for the eventuality of a popular rebellion against the regime; and I concluded: "Why was it, General, that when you joined the Revolution you did not communicate to the army commanders the plan that these elements are following?" At which he went beet red and asked for a glass of water; he took some pills and said tersely: "There was no plan." At that I turned to the eight generals of the War Council and asked them: "Generals, can you conceive of a situation in which your men, the troops under your command, may follow a plan of which you are not aware?" To which they answered in unison: "No." I had persuaded the military [commanders] that Iulian Vlad was conning them, that he was playing a double game. That had been my main objective. Gen. Vlad then asked to be granted 24 hours to prove that indeed he was on the side of the Revolution, in which time he was going to carry out an action with the support of army troops which, he claimed, would result in the capture of most of the shooters.

[Andon] Did he provide details on the action?

[Brucan] No details. The generals agreed to give him a last chance, but he failed. He failed partly because during the night General Stanculescu destroyed or dismantled a radio station located on top of the Telephone Palace, which Iulian Vlad used to stay in touch with his men without the knowledge of the army. Deprived of that means of communications with them, the action planned could probably no longer be carried out.

[Andon] Who were the eight generals in the War Council?

[Brucan] First of all Militaru, then Vasile Ionel, Logofatul, Hortopan, Chitac, Stanculescu.... The others I don't remember.

[Andon] In the course of the year further hypotheses emerged about the number of terrorists and to which units they belonged. Do you still have the same faith in your hypothesis?

[Brucan] I have even greater faith, because at the time I didn't have written proof of the establishment of those special troops. Now I have that proof. Here is a copy of it, marked "secret;" note that this is a Xerox copy numbered 01.

[Andon] I see this is the interior minister's Order No. 02600 of 5 July 1988...

[Brucan] ...Yes, it is the order approving the "Instructions on measures to be taken by Interior Ministry bodies and units to enhance combat and intervention

capabilities for the purpose of resolutely carrying out the duties assigned to them for ensuring law enforcement and order."

[Andon] I'm familiar with the verbiage because the order was mentioned in several trials for participation in genocide held this year.

[Brucan] The document was mentioned at trials but has still not been published. As for the verbiage and the euphemisms, their purpose is to conceal the true purpose of the order, namely to establish squads of snipers.

[Andon] Please cite some of the more suggestive provisions of the document.

[Brucan] One suggestive passage is Article 11 paragraph 2 of the "Instructions:" "If public order has been seriously disrupted, upon the order of the head of the Interior Ministry county inspectorate and on the basis of the provisions of the uniform plan of action, antiterrorist defense units and other available security-intervention units will also participate in restoring public order." Or Article 29: "The actual intervention will be carried out by surprise, resolutely, and by using specific forms, methods, and equipment against those who committed acts of rioting and anarchy, forcibly entered premises, and attacked persons or property, for the purpose of neutralizing them."

[Andon] All that is mentioned in the 38 pages of this document is at most "antiterrorist" squads.

[Brucan] First of all, its historical background is important. After the workers' rebellion in Brasov on 15 November 1987 that took Ceausescu by surprise, he ordered proposals on how to identify and annihilate such popular movements. The outcome was this Order 02600 signed by the minister of interior. This should come as no surprise. Throughout its practice, the Ceausescu regime avoided leaving clear evidence of the illegal actions it ordered. In point of fact, those were commando squads, terrorists, not "antiterrorists." On that basis, the Securitate Academy led by General Nicolae A. Ceausescu; USLA [expansion unknown] under Colonel Ardeleanu; and Bucharest's Municipal Security under Colonel Goran were incorporated in the plan of action. The terrorists who went into action as of the evening of 22 December had been recruited from among them. The delay can be explained by the fact that the Ceausescus' escape had not and could not have been foreseen in the plan. It caused them a few hours of confusion.

[Andon] Do you rule out the existence of other terrorist squads in addition to the ones that may be inferred from Order 02600 and the instructions for its implementation?

[Brucan] Yes, those were the terrorists, it is futile to speculate that others may have existed, too. I want to repeat my statement that all the terrorists who were arrested or surrendered were later released by officers of the security troops.

[Andon] We want to thank you for this talk; please allow us to remain open to any proof or plausible hypothesis concerning the mysterious issue of those who caused the bloodshed after the dictator's escape.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Prospects of Cooperation With Albania Reviewed

91ES0379X Athens *ELEVTHEROTIPIA* in Greek
16 Jan 91 p 45

[Text] "There will be greater prospects for an increase in economic and commercial relations between Greece and Albania as long as the preconditions exist for a continuation of the democratization process in that country."

Alternate Minister of Commerce Sot. Khatzigakis made the above comment when he announced a grant of \$20 million to Albania by the National Bank, General Bank, Ionian Bank, and Credit Bank. Terms for the loan will be the same as those set for credit facilities to the Soviet Union. It should be made clear at this point that there are today no Albanian benefits for Greek exporters.

Mr. Khatzigakis, who accompanied Prime Minister Mitsotakis on his trips to Bulgaria and Albania, had contacts with his counterparts in these two countries during which the following things resulted:

- Albania is interested in Greek investments, especially with regard to light industry. Greece has maintained that for investments to be made an investment climate should prevail so that interested Greek investors might understand the terms involved.
- Greek and Albanian construction firms are expressing interest in the project involving the construction of the Egnatia highway linking Tirana and Durres as well as the Kakavia-Tirana highway. Nevertheless, there is a problem relating to the financing of these projects.
- Albania is examining the matter of issuing a limited number of visas to Greek merchants so as to broaden crossborder trade between the two countries.

Mr. Yermidhis

Two offices of the National Bank will be opened in Albania within two months at the latest, one in Tirana and one in Gjinokaster, so as to strengthen trade relations and joint investment plans between the two countries.

These plans were announced yesterday at a press conference in Ioannina given by Mr. Dhimitris Yermidhis, director of the National Bank who was a member of the Greek mission to Albania.

Agni Vravoritou, *ELEVTHEROTIPIA*'s correspondent in Ioannina, reported the following details:

Mr. Yermidhis stressed that as soon as conditions permit these two offices will be converted into branches that will be staffed by experienced bank officials during the first phase and by Greeks of the Greek minority in Albania.

At the same time, the following were agreed upon:

- The National Bank of Greece will provide the State Bank of Albania every form of technical assistance to establish a modern banking system and, more specifically, to set up a commercial bank.
- The National Bank of Greece, with the cooperation of the Union of Greek Banks, intends to undertake the retraining of Albanian bank employees in Greece.
- The two banks will upgrade and broaden their bilateral credit facilities.
- Finally, the two banks will broaden the possibility of creating a joint bank in the future, namely between the National Bank of Greece, the State Bank of Albania, and possibly an EEC member country bank.

During his visit to Albania, Mr. Yermidhis determined that the Albanian banking system was obsolete and he pointed out that the changes that would be made would come within the broader context of developments in that neighboring country so that the Albanian banking system too might develop into an exemplary level market. Mr. Yermidhis added that all of the above are tied in with developments in national issues between Greece and Turkey.

Finally, Mr. Yermidhis stressed that in contacts he had with Greek businessmen it appeared that investments in Albania were centered on tourism and agriculture as well as in hotel enterprises.

In the meantime, Mr. Filippas Filios, mayor of Ioannina, gave a press conference yesterday morning in which he pointed out that during a meeting with Prime Minister Mitsotakis he informed him about the situation prevailing in Ioannina Nome because of the influx of refugees, as well as about the unanimous decision of the municipal council on financial support of the region and also of Albania.

Cooperation in Tourism

Finally, Mr. Pan. Tsoukanelis, president of the Ioannina Chamber of Commerce, gave a press conference in which he noted that both his trip to Albania and the contacts he had there were very positive in nature and constituted a justification of the demands by businessmen for an economic opening with Albania.

An agreement for cooperation in tourism was signed between Greece and Albania during Prime Minister Mitsotakis' recent visit to Tirana.

As the EOT [Greece Tourist Organization] announced, the agreement provides for cooperation between the two countries for the realization of tourist investments as well as providing know-how on tourist matters by experts.

Even more, an encouragement of tourism is being provided through all forms of transportation, as well as through setting up tourist itineraries between the two countries, something that will facilitate tourism and the

organization of tours. With this agreement, the previous one that limited the number of Greek tourists to Albania to 3,000 a year was cancelled. During discussions between M. Rafail, EOT president, and his Albanian counterparts the possibility of realizing tourist investments in the Agioi Saranda area was discussed and for that reason Minister of Tourism I. Kefaloyannis is planning a visit to Albania.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Volkswagen To Restructure Skoda Auto Production

91CH0257A Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 19 Dec 90 pp 8-9

[Article by Eng. Jiri Clupek, Institute for Motor Vehicle Research, and Petr Ehrlich: "End of the Battle for the Favorit, Start of the Battle for Quality"]

[Text] We have been gradually introducing the Volkswagen concern, which has become the chosen partner for the Skoda automobile plant, to our readers. These articles have appeared in No. 41 (the article "Battle for the Favorit"), in No. 45 ("Thoughts of the Week" column), and in No. 46 (the article "Confession From the Assembly Line"). Today we present an analysis of why the alliance between the Skoda plant and the largest European automaker had to happen, how it eventually happened, and what we can expect in the near future from this "marriage." Clearly, this article will not be the last on the VW-Skoda theme. The weekly HOSPODARSKE NOVINY will attempt to be among the first to provide as detailed information as possible, as we have done in the past.

The decision to allow foreign capital to participate in the manufacture of passenger cars in Czechoslovakia meets a longstanding need to increase automobile production, and the related need to increase car sales abroad. Experts in our automobile industry were aware of this requirement, but were unable to do anything about it in the midst of a declining economy.

Efficiency Criticized

Production at the Skoda factory in Mlada Boleslav peaked at 180,000 cars annually in 1976, and since that time has fluctuated around this figure, with production declining when new models are introduced. The limitation has been an assembly line for engines that dates back to 1963. Attempts to increase output to about 250,000 cars per year and about 400,000 to 500,000 engines in cooperation with the GDR foundered on the inability of the two economies to complete the project. Moreover, the project led in this country to the inefficient, long running construction of new facilities at the Bratislava Automobile Factories, which remained without a sensible production program even after the objectives of GDR-CSFR cooperation had been officially announced as completed.

Pursuant to the goal of building a new engine plant for this joint program, Skoda brought out the innovative Type 742 (105-130) in 1976. Approval of the resources for the introduction of this model was contingent on retaining the basic concept, namely locating the engine in the rear of the car. The obsolescence of this concept made it necessary, after the joint project with the GDR was concluded, to come up with another innovative vehicle. This program resulted in the Type 781, known as the Favorit.

Decisions concerning production runs of this model, which were made at a time of a marketing crisis on the domestic market, ended up at the former figure of 180,000 vehicles per year, and assumed that the production equipment for the old engine could be adapted with minor changes. Only thanks to increasing demands for emission control legislation in the European marketing area were we able to get approval for an innovative engine using an aluminum, eight-channel cylinder head and significantly modernized auxiliary equipment (carburetor, ignition system) and components (pistons, rings, spark plugs).

While developing the Favorit it became clear the production of the existing engine plant would not be sufficient. It also became clear that there were capacity problems not only in the engine plant, but with other suppliers as well. The volume of total investment required to expand production reached a level that the center found to be unacceptable. Negotiations to license engine production also were inconclusive.

The failure to develop a program for passenger car production, and the inability of the government managed economy to correct the long term neglect of related production areas became one of the heritages of this style of management and evidence of the failure of this type of economic system. During discussions on the effectiveness of developing passenger car production its importance to our economy became clear, and a decision was made to attract foreign capital in conjunction with the privatization of the industry.

With Foreign Capital

Negotiations were not easy here either, requiring an understanding of the problems on both sides of the bargaining table. This in turn led to a clarification of the regulations governing this kind of project on the part of government offices and other participants. At the same time foreign partners gradually learned the specifics of the problems facing us and could tailor their offers to meet these needs. During these talks knowledge was also gained of our production firms, and experience gained from observations of the activities of foreign consulting organizations when evaluating Czechoslovak businesses and the various offers.

This process resulted in the selection of two financial groups for participation in Mlada Boleslav Skoda: the German firm Volkswagen and the recently formed (February 1990) Franco-Swedish group Renault-Volvo (with

Renault having the chief interest in passenger cars). Both financial groups were allowed to acquaint themselves in more detail with the potential and equipment available at our automobile plants, with a view to developing economic regulations covering financing, tax policy, internal convertibility, etc.

Generally it can be said that the Volkswagen group had a more clearly developed participation strategy from the start of the talks, and maintained this position with only minor changes. These changes occurred more often as a result of changes in the understanding of the Czechoslovak side (inclusion or exclusion of the Bratislava Automobile Factories, possibility for other participants, etc.)

The Renault-Volvo group, which originally entered the talks as Renault, changed its strategy during the talks in a way that eliminated its disadvantages in comparison with the offer of the German side. These changes even affected the financial package. On the other hand, Volkswagen did not change the terms of its financial offer. Talks also included politicoeconomic considerations stemming from fears of excessive economic hegemony by a united Germany in the future united Europe, into which the former socialist countries were attempting to integrate themselves.

Strengthening Development Capacity

The chief reason that foreign capital is interested in a share of our automobile industry is to gain significant market share in the countries of the disintegrating CEMA. These countries at the present time do not have enough freely convertible resources to allow immediate market penetration in the form of imported products at price levels of western markets. Czechoslovak vehicles will be usable in part thanks to their partial penetration on these markets.

Because of the problems the Czechoslovak economy will encounter during the period of internal koruna convertibility, it is important to foreign partners that the automobiles produced be marketable on markets with hard currencies. This makes possible both the formation of resources for the transfer of returns on invested capital, as well as the procurement of component parts and materials needed for production at the requisite level of sophistication, which does not exist yet in our country.

This marketability is helped by the:

- Use of existing sales and service networks.
- Retention of the Skoda trademark (this also allows us to take advantage of special pricing without ruining the price image of the foreign partner).
- Offer to expand sales possibilities by building our own sales and service network.

—Introduction of quality improvement programs at our factories that have already proved themselves at Volkswagen, and publicizing them to improve the image of our vehicles.

These are all proven techniques that Volkswagen used successfully during the privatization and integration of the Seat government-owned firm in Spain. Volkswagen proposed to apply these same techniques to the Skoda factory.

Retaining the Skoda trademark allows the future manufacture of vehicles different from the Volkswagen line. This requires, though, the existence of a domestic technical development capability. The Volkswagen offer, in fact, included not only the retention of current development capability but its enhancement and improvement. A new development center is planned that will allow work comparable to that being performed at other such centers of the company. (VW experts were very surprised that our technicians had succeeded in developing a car as good as the Favorit considering the conditions they were working under.)

The Volkswagen offer anticipates the following approach:

—Not waiting for additional production capacity, but increasing Favorit production to 250,000 units per year in phase 1 by fully utilizing assembly lines. VW will provide up to 60,000 engines, with capacities up to 1,600 cc., in a configuration that meets emission control standards, meaning that the engines will be outfitted with catalytic converters and a monitored fuel system. These vehicles would be exported mainly to hard currency markets.

—Taking measures to improve the quality of these 250,000 cars (such as surface treatments) and make modifications that will expand the product line.

—Making at least one major modification to the Favorit before the end of its production run (roughly 1998).

—Constructing a new engine plant with an annual capacity of 450,000 engines, newly designed for the 1,400-to-200-cc class. These engines are being considered for a future integrated production venture. Initially the engines will be distributed through the VW network.

—After starting up the Favorit program and fully utilizing engine manufacturing capability, the production of new chassis components as part of the overall company plan to build an integrated vehicle (more spacious than the Favorit), for introduction in about 1998.

While the schedule for this program appears very realistic and feasible, meeting the deadlines will be difficult because private industry does not tolerate failures to meet deadline objectives.

The Volkswagen offer also seems reasonable in terms of the allocation of investment resources. In addition, increasing the number of Favorits produced should improve economic efficiency enough for the financial proceeds of production to be usable to finance internal development. The volume of investment resources being offered corresponds roughly to the amount that VW has in mind investing in the GDR in the Zwickau-Mosel factory (about 5 billion West German marks) and to expand licensed engine production at Chemnitz (570 million West German marks).

Seat Proof of Success

A frequently discussed issue in negotiations concerning foreign participation in our firm is the share of foreign capital as a percentage of the total capital of the firm, and therefore the degree of influence exercised by the foreign firm in management. It looks like VW will have approximately a 30 percent share of Skoda in the first phase. This also makes sense for Volkswagen, because it makes the transfer of returns on the invested capital more likely without making demands on foreign currency resources from elsewhere in the Czechoslovak economy.

In the case of the firm Seat, VW began with a 51 percent share, but in the subsequent two phases the government holding company sold VW its remaining share, so that as of 31 December 1990, VW owned 100 percent of Seat. The reasons for the sale are not known, but might involve efforts by the Spanish government to rectify a negative balance of payments for the Spanish economy, bearing also in mind that denationalization has to be completed before the 1992 integration of the European community. Increases in percentage shares are also common when a firm needs additional capital resources for investment and these are provided by increasing the share in the company of the provider of the resources (this is the way that General Motors share of the Japanese firm Isuzu is increasing).

These examples should be instructive for Czechoslovak holders of Skoda stock. If these stockholders want to maintain or increase their holdings, they will need not only a large number of privatization coupons, but also the participation of partners with a stronger capital position (banks).

If a logical condition for entry into the integrated European economy is the denationalization of enterprises, then it would be wise to recognize that Czechoslovak bank capital participation in the stock of a successful company will not be a disadvantage.

The Suppliers' Turn

The decision concerning the large privatization of Skoda with foreign capital participation does not end the necessary process of developing passenger car production in this country. This production depends on a multitude of suppliers of accessories and components. These manufacturers must adapt to increased demands for both

numbers and quality, and to increased competition from foreign firms as true currency convertibility nears.

The resource allocation methods for the automobile industry in the past forgot about these suppliers. Investment resources were allocated to innovation programs at the automakers, but resources for the suppliers were allocated only marginally. Nevertheless, they were usually obtained, after drawn out bureaucratic procedures, for the most pressing projects, either from the automakers or from central resources. In other words, CEMA working methods were shown to be inefficient for developing the production of accessories and parts.

Ideas of obtaining resources for further development of individual firms through resource reallocation ended with privatization. The foreign partner of an automaker is not an adventurer who would invest in suppliers who are not part of the company in which it is investing. Moreover, the foreign firm will have detailed knowledge concerning the extent to which integration of the production of accessories and parts with the operations of the automaker is most efficient.

Volkswagen, however, recognized the importance of developing domestic suppliers, and included in its offer an analysis of the current status of the main suppliers in terms of the quality of their products, technical sophistication, equipment, management qualifications, existing licensing relationships, and known objectives for future relations with foreign producers. This research was also the basis for negotiations of the foreign partner with its main suppliers, to whom it is recommending the initiation of financial participation with selected Czechoslovak suppliers.

This first large privatization project will generate a number of related projects, with the deadlines and urgencies of each dictated by economic necessity. At the same time, one cannot assume that the development of the manufacturing of parts and accessories will be generally possible after the entry of foreign capital. Cooperation with foreign firms can be on different terms with greater initiative likely to be expected from internal resources.

In the area of accessories and parts certain specific problems must be taken into account:

—It will first be necessary to confirm whether the manufacturer will be able to increase Favorit production while also meeting demands for improved quality (as well as requirements for product innovation in conjunction with necessary modernization of the Favorit).

—In conjunction with the automaker it will be necessary to confirm whether the manufacturer can meet delivery demands for new engines and for integrated chassis units for the future production program. For critical parts it will therefore be necessary to identify

equivalent substitute parts made by the foreign partner (which in turn means in all likelihood relationships with his suppliers).

- It will be necessary to reevaluate all existing license relationships, which usually specify that all production must be delivered exclusively to manufacturers in the CEMA countries.
- When negotiating capital participation of the foreign partner it will be necessary to clarify not only development for the near term, but also the period covering integration into the European community when, we hope, the lower wage levels here will disappear, and maximum production efficiency will be the main criterion.
- The foreign partner should, to assure the permanence of the relationship, at least set forth the expectations of our manufacturers within the integrated economy. Our manufacturer then should try to justify this role with top notch work in all assigned areas. At the same time we should anticipate that in the integration stage these assignments may not be tied in any way to Skoda products.

The decision concerning the Mlada Boleslav Skoda factory has initiated "large" privatization. It is obvious that this is a decision that will generate other projects, as voluntary movements caused by economic pressures. The question may be raised of whether it is wise to resolve in this context the issue of the Bratislava Automobile Factory, or in another context with other contingencies.

We should also take note of the situation in the former GDR, where two competing foreign partners have entered the market, VW at the Zwickau and Chemnitz factories and Opel as GM's representative at Eisenach, even though this factory is currently buying VW licensed engines from Chemnitz. Here there may be a role for the position of the United Cartel Office, which controls foreign stock participation in German financial groups. This office has recently refused to approve the purchase of the government enterprise ENASA, which produces Pegaso trucks, by the Daimler-Benz and MAN companies, citing antimonopoly regulations, opening the field to the Iveco holding company, which belongs to the Fiat group. It cannot be ruled out, therefore, that including Bratislava Automobile factory stock in the same organization as Mlada Boleslav Skoda might provoke a similar ruling from the Bundeskartellamt.

What, and for How Much, From Volkswagen?

Volkswagen manufactured 2.9 million vehicles in the past year, placing it fourth worldwide and first on the European continent. It manufactured the largest numbers of the Golf model, 880,000, making the total production of two generations of Golfs 14 million since 1974.

The least expensive Volkswagen is the Seat Marbella, sold in Germany with a base price of 9,675 West German marks. This is the lowest price for a car of West European provenance. On the other hand, the company's production program includes one of the most expensive production cars, the Audi V8 luxury limousine, which can be purchased in its country of manufacture for 98,700 West German marks, without accessories.

As a new model the Favorit lies, in terms of size, between the Seat Ibiza and VW Polo on the one hand and the VW Golf as representatives of the lower middle class on the other hand. In terms of price (currently 11,690 to 13,990 West German marks) it ranks between the Seat Marbella and Ibiza.

The greatest range of models is represented by the VW Golf/Jetta line, offered with 1.3, 1.6, and 1.8 liter gasoline engines and with a 1.6 liter diesel engine in a total of 11 performance variations (40-118 kilowatts), six body styles, several option packages, with front wheel drive, all wheel drive being an option, and large numbers of accessories. The prices vary widely as well. The least expensive Golf can be purchased for just a little over 18,000 West German marks, while the most expensive GTI 660 costs almost 36,000 West German marks.

Most Volkswagens hold another first in their classes, namely waiting time for a new car. The current waiting time for a VW Polo in Europe now is four to six months, six months for a Golf, and still longer for some models. Lack of production capacity is one reason for the interest in our automobile plant.

Sportscar fans also have their needs met by all three of the European manufacturers that comprise VW. The least expensive Seat SXi can be "had" for 20,880 marks, the sport versions of VW, the Golf GTI starting at 27,730 marks, and the Audi Coupe starting at 39,600 marks.

4 Heirs Interested in Restaurant U Fleku

*91CH0257B Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY
in Czech 4 Jan 91 p 3*

[Article by Anna Drabova: "U Fleku Has Owners"]

[Text] The beloved old Czech restaurant and brewery U Fleku, a mecca for many foreign tourists in Prague, will not be up for sale under either the small or large privatization programs. Four heirs of the last owner, Vaclav Brtnik, have expressed an interest in the business.

The tradition of a brewery on Kremencova Street began in the 15th century. The name U Fleku dates, however, from 1762, when Jakub Flekovsky bought the property. Today it is among the most lucrative in Prague. Revenues last year were almost 23.5 million Czech korunas [Kcs], compared with Kcs18.8 million in 1989. The restaurant boasts a clientele from all over the world. It is

well known not only by Germans, Austrians, Italians, Hungarians, Yugoslavs, and other Europeans, but also by Japanese, Australians, and numerous tourists from distant countries.

Jindrich Kratky, current operator of the business, admitted to us that, beginning on 1 January 1991, a half liter of the dark, 6.5 proof Flek beer costs Kcs9.40 (previously it was Kcs7.70). The increased price will certainly not put off the foreign tourists though. The restaurant is often literally bursting at the seams. The last big load test was at the end of last year. "We managed to handle the huge crowd only because the weather was favorable," manager Kratky states. "I don't remember any other time in the winter when guests have been able to sit outside. This time from 27 December to New Year's we were full in the courtyard and in the garden."

There are 1,150 seats at the tables. The small capacity of the kitchen does not match the seating, however. Customers therefore wait long periods for some dishes. For this reason some of the menu items have been eliminated, including the crunchy toasts, which tasted so good with the Flek beer. Two private apartments prevent the expansion of the kitchen. The renters have nowhere to go, and they would probably move if they could, because U Fleku is often busy and noisy far into the night (it closes at 1100 hours).

The new owners of the facility asked J. Kratky to continue as manager. How many of the current 80 employees will be retained remains to be seen. What is certain is that the ones who work well have a better chance of staying on, because the barometer will be customer satisfaction.

POLAND

Retrospective of 1989-90 Economic Legislation

91EP0224A Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA in Polish
No 52-53, 23 Dec 90-5 Jan 91 p 11

[Article by Maciej Urbanski: "An Enumeration"]

[Text] We began 1990 in a state of light shock. The changes made in Poland in the last six months of the 1980's made the world dizzy. And they could have given a heart attack to the lawyers, particularly those of the older generation, and the directors, chief accountants, economists, private businessmen, and all those who have anything at all to do with managing the economy. Overnight, they had to begin to think in a new way, to use a different law.

The final days of 1989 were both exciting and exhausting for the parliamentary reporter. The deputies, especially those took part in the work of the Extraordinary Commission, directed by Prof. Andrzej Zawislak, usually had it "up to here". Simply coming close to the Wiejska

neighborhood drove some of them a little crazy. The Sejm held plenary meetings every week. The commissions worked round the clock.

Out of this murderous grind came the framework of the system of economic laws which has ruled us since 1 January 1990. That is the date on which the socialist economic system came to a final end, although we are still a long way from true, modern capitalism.

Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz's famous first legislative packet contained 11 laws. The Sejm passed 10 of them within the designated time limit. It would be well to recollect these laws. Recollect them with the awareness that not all of the decisions that were made at that time have passed the test of time, that some provisions have already been amended, and that others may be amended within the foreseeable future.

In the second-to-last issue, No. 74, of *DZIENNIK USTAW* [the legal gazette] in 1989, were the following:

- An amendment to the Law on the Financial Management of Private Enterprises.
- The Law on Taxing the Growth of Remunerations in 1990, i.e., another extremely drastic version of the tax on above-the-plan wage increases, somewhat mitigated this summer.
- A change in the Banking Law and the Law on the National Bank of Poland [NBP] liberalizing the provisions pertaining to the creation of new banks and making the NBP bank a real central bank, insofar as possible.
- A law regulating credit relations, so acutely felt by creditors.
- A rather liberal amendment to the Law on foreign Exchange.
- Amendments to both laws regulating the functioning of foreign-capital ventures.
- A law revising the tax system by a simultaneous change in many existing tax regulations, which unfortunately still does not infringe on the essence of the system.

In last year's final issue of *DZIENNIK USTAW*, the new Law on Tariffs was published and the Law on Employment, popularly called the law for the jobless.

The Senate amended the Law on Special Rules Governing Employee Separations for reasons relating to workplace, which came to be called the law on group dismissals. And it went into effect very quickly. The Senate amendments, at the personal request of Minister Kuron, were voted through in the Sejm on the principle that what cannot be rejected must be accepted. Although the government did not conceal the fact that it really did not support the position of the other chamber, it recognized that this was better than a legislative stalemate.

This idea was applied in the Sejm several times before, before the deputies from all the parliamentary clubs became accustomed to the rule of solidarity of the entire chamber, expressed in voting in accordance with the

instructions of the Sejm commission. Sejm solidarity was broken only exceptionally, only in matters which were politically controversial.

Out of this first packet, only the Law on Combating Monopolistic Practices was a long time in passing. The deputies radically changed the government concept. On the groundwork of the plan, they created a completely new, reasonably efficient law, making it possible not only to combat the effects of monopolistic practices, but also the reasons for the monopolization of the economy. True, the law has its defects (Anna Fornalczyk, president of the Antimonopoly Office, spoke of them in issue No 50, GAZETA BANKOWA), but it also has some undeniable advantages.

But regardless of the current effects of reform, these 11 laws created a new quality in the system of economic law—a situation in which only a political cataclysm on the scale of at least a continent could derail Poland from the construction of a modern market economy.

This year's changes in economic law were concentrated on two basic goals: the restructuring of the national economy and the creation of a legal infrastructure for its functioning under new conditions.

On 20 January the Sejm passed the Law on Changes in the Organization and Activities of Cooperatives and a minor amendment to the Law on Cooperatives. They aroused a great deal of controversy. The liquidation, by law, of an entire cooperative superstructure—central and voivodship cooperative unions—could not occur without pain. This was not an easy decision. Structures affiliating autonomous cooperatives also appear in market economies. But in choosing a path, the guiding conviction was that they must form spontaneously. The existing central and voivodship cooperative unions were accustomed to functioning in the old style and under the old rules. The cooperative section was, for over 40 years, deprived of independence and self-management. Too many substantive and personnel decisions were made outside of the elected cooperative organs. Too many people achieved high positions through privilege or in another game of musical chairs.

But the law turned out to be extremely difficult to execute. The tempo of the work on it (first very slow and then decidedly too quick) was determined by political, not substantive, considerations. As a result, the liquidators, working for almost a year already, still cannot boast of any special successes. The old structures are reappearing here and there in the form of megacooperatives, companies, or foundations, not always effectively blocked by the Antimonopoly Office and the courts.

Directed at the so-called nomenklatura companies is the Law on Return of Benefits Obtained Unjustly at the Expense of the State Treasury or Other State Legal Entities, known popularly, from the name of the first proposer, as "lex Dwyer."

The ostensibly small amendment to the Commercial Code, which changes the minimum sums indispensable for the establishing of limited liability companies or stock companies, prevents the formation of decrepit economic organizations, with almost zero capital. These minimum sums (10 million zlotys for a limited liability company and 250 million for a stock company) still are not high and do not block the creation of new legal entities. But they do give a greater certainty of economic trade.

But most important for the future changes of the economy and its forms of ownership are the privatization laws. The Sejm labored over them for a very long time. As a result of the work of the next Extraordinary Commission, also functioning under the direction of Prof. Zawislak, the government-proposed Agency for Ownership Transformations ultimately became a ministry, a citizens' stockholding institution (privatization certificates) was added to the plans, and regulations on employee stock option plans were tightened up. For a long time, the laws could not begin to exert an effect on the economic realities. Political storms made it impossible for the prime minister to fill the position of Minister of Ownership Transformations before the parliament's vacation recess, which prolonged the time for making the indispensable decisions. The necessary executive acts did not appear and agreement with the Sejm as to filling the positions on the Ownership Transformations Council was not obtained.

The amendment to the Law on Land management and REal Estate Expropriation, closely relating to privatization, making it possible to regulate the status of the assets of state enterprises, also went into force after considerable delay. The disputes on whether it will be permissible to sell State Treasury and municipal real estate to foreigners went on for a long time and made it necessary for President Jaruzelski to intervene. The president signed the law only after parliament approved an amendment to the 1920 law on selling real estate to foreigners, ordering the minister of internal affairs to report to the Senate each year on the policy of issuing permits in these matters.

All of this pushing did not serve large privatization well. Small privatization also had its legal problems. An Order signed by the minister of finance on the Rules for Establishing the Amount of Payment Due for Use of State Treasury Property was issued only a month ago.

But the key to small privatization are the regulations excluding nondwelling premises from the action of the premises law. The change in this law, made by the Sejm after a stormy discussion and with tremendous opposition from various lobbies which did not want to see the management of premises marketized, makes it possible to renegotiate rents and put shops up for auction. That fact that, in passing, the pathological greed of some territorial and cooperative self-governments revealed itself in full force is something else. The rents for some shops in Warsaw and other cities are higher than in New

York, London, or Antwerp. But the regulations cannot be blamed for this. Freedom guaranteed by law also means a duty to use this freedom responsibly. This has to be learned.

A few months ago a new law appeared on insurance activities, breaking the legal monopoly of the State Insurance Bureau and Warta, opening (although not entirely) the Polish insurance market to foreign capital. This is an important event, not only for the average individual who is insuring his house or his automobile, for which competition on this market may mean lower rates and more favorable insurance terms, but above all, it is very important to economic organizations which want to insure their sales and production operations. This type of insurance activity, so widespread in market economies, is only in the infant stage in our country.

It is impossible to overstate the importance, for economic transactions, of changes in the Civil Law Codes. The codes, which until now, regulated the rights and duties of private and public-sector organizations separately, are now the same for everyone. The clearly expressed principle of the freedom of contracts provides an opportunity for correctly shaping contractual relations between economic organizations. The Antimonopoly Office protects the weaker partners against their possible distortion.

Changes in civil law are also enormously important to agriculture. The sale of land has been freed from the restraints of the past orders and prohibitions in the provisions of the contracts between the farmers and the government for the supply of agricultural products. The position of the farm producers in relation to the procuring organizations has also been improved.

The Agricultural Marketing Agency will also serve the farmers. Its operations are supposed to stabilize prices in the procurement and sales of farm products.

So much for the list of only the more important economic laws. But for economic practice, the policy of the applications of these laws is equally as important as their legislative rank—a policy expressed in the form of executive regulations. This policy bore the distinct stamp of immediacy. In the first 80 issues of this year's *DZIENNIK USTAW* (I wonder if it will reach 100?), I counted at least 36 different kinds of order on tax. There was also this monstrosity: "the Order Changing the Date the Order on the Repeal of the Order Goes Into Effect"...oy! However, I did not count the number of instructions issued by the Minister of Finance on tax matters, published in *MONITOR POLSKI*.

A number of orders this year pertained to tariff policy. Several times tariff rates on particular commodities were eased or suspended, which promoted export and was to bring about an increase in imports of market commodities and producer goods. The effect of the alcohol affair was to partially suspend imports and then to introduce licenses for the import of alcohol.

The government and the ministers were quite consistent in attempting to abolish the old regulations governing the functioning of specific areas of the economy. In this category is the Order of the Ministry of Transportation and Maritime Economy repealing the Order on Domestic Automobile Transport.

What can we expect next year? Definitely a regulation pertaining to a stock exchange and the sale of securities, another comprehensive change in the banking law, new regulations on foreign capital, a law on commodity exchanges, a completely new tax system, and a law on ownership transformations in the cooperative movement.

Probably an amendment to the Law on Enterprises and Self-Managements, another amendment to the Commercial Code introducing new types of companies. But it is the new government and probably a new Sejm which will have to worry about this.

It is expected also that there will be a consistent airing of lower ranking standardization acts to adapt them to present conditions. *GAZETA BANKOWA* requests reports on such regulations.

The lawyers and businessmen (private, state, cooperative) will have a great deal to learn. To draw maximum benefits from the law, one has to know it and its constantly changing interpretations. The enumeration of the laws will be continued—in a year.

Foundry Representatives Discuss Restructuring

91EP0225B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 27 Dec 90 p II

[Article by Zbigniew Wyczesany: "Foundry Restructuring"]

[Text] A few hundred representatives of Polish iron, steel, and ferrous-alloy foundries came, at their own expense and without hesitation, to a meeting which was organized in Warsaw a few days ago by Bogdan Miedzinski, president of the Fund for Structural Changes in Industry.

Foundry engineering, one of the most difficult types of industry, and at the same time the base for all practical types of processing industry, is experiencing a recession. Production is dropping on a scale still hard to describe.

According to figures from a recent Supreme Chamber of Control [NIK] inspection in this industry, there were 338 ferroalloy foundries in Poland in 1989 (287 were iron foundries and 51 were steel foundries). Most of the foundries were departments and sections in various industrial enterprises and only 10 percent were independent enterprises. According to NIK, employment in ferroalloy foundries in 1989 totaled 40,000.

Even the most skilled hands cannot compete today with computer methods. The methods and technologies used in our industry do not meet world standards.

But, we believe, every producer of castings in the world would unhesitatingly hire our casting experts, because what counts in this profession is experience and a sure hand, to say nothing about a sharp eye.

In our production of castings thus far, gray iron has dominated, while throughout the world spheroidal iron is widely used, e.g., in the FRG, about 26 percent, and in the United States, 31 percent, while in Poland in 1989 spheroidal iron constituted slightly over three percent. We yield to the world in melting technologies, molding methods, mechanization and automation of casting processes, labor conditions, and pollution control.

These shortcomings are only too familiar to the Polish foundrymen, who look upon the restructuring of the industry, sponsored by the Structural Changes Fund, as the beginning of quality transformations in this industry. The times are such that the entire economy is experiencing a deep recession and the financial condition of industrial firms is not the best.

Must we be so emotional on the subject of the bad technical and economic condition of the Polish foundries? Perhaps there is no reason for that, as the representatives of the Dutch Restructuring Agency Nehem proved to the Polish foundrymen. It took the Netherlands at least 12 years to pass into the "fourth dimension". It took three-plus years to determine the engineering, technological and financial state of the foundry industry in the Netherlands before the Nehem firm formulated a plan to restructure an iron foundry during 1976-80. Only then did the state administration support with subsidies those firms which showed the most effective proposals. An assessment of the results achieved went on for three years after 1979.

In Poland we do not have that much time for detailed economic and financial analyses. We had in past years, and still have today, conditions that are different from those of the Dutch firms. But many problems are the same, which indicates that possibly the Dutch will be able to advise our managers on how, through joint effort and with the support of the Structural Changes Fund, the foundry industry can emerge from the state of frustration and recession to be at the head of Polish industry.

The representatives of the banks and the business world listened attentively to the deliberations of the Polish foundrymen.

There was no break for lunch, nor were there any cocktails after the meeting. It is obvious that the matter is serious.

Electronic Mail Service To Be Established

*91EP0209A Warsaw GAZETA BANKOWA in Polish
No 49, 2-8 Dec 90 p 21*

[Article by Jerzy Krajewski: "The Success of Polish Telecommunications"]

[Text] The launch of the first electronic mail service in Eastern Europe is under way. Because of it, it will be

easier to get through to the farthest corner of the earth. About 200 similar systems are already operating in 70 countries. In the West they are known as Electronic Mail Service, abbreviated EMS. The system established in Poland is called Multicom. Preparations for putting it in service have been going on for just three months.

The most important element of electronic mail is the central computer, in whose memory each subscriber has an assigned box. All telex, computer, and facsimile correspondence going to the subscriber is routed to that box. The subscriber can be informed automatically about the arrival of correspondence. From any telephone (to which a computer with a V21, V22 or V22 bis modem is attached), telex, or telefax machine, the subscriber can remove the correspondence from his box and make a paper copy.

The key to connecting with Multicom is telephone number 974. The system recognizes the subscriber on the basis of a password. The central computer verifies whether that person is recorded in its memory, is not behind in payments, and for which operations he is authorized, i.e., can merely receive correspondence or offer or use other services. If this test turns out favorably, he can connect with the entire world.

TESA Telecommunication Co., Ltd. is setting up electronic mail here. The history of that firm underscores the role of happy coincidence in business. The TESA partnership is the brainchild of its vice president, Teresa Janczak, who says of herself modestly, "I am just the animator, the yeast person."

It all began with a misdirected telephone conversation. Ms. Janczak worked at the Foreign Trade Enterprise [PHZ] UNITRA, where she was involved with exporting technological concepts and employing Polish specialists abroad. In April 1989, a representative of the Central Union of Housing Cooperatives called her with a question: did she know of a contact in the West German firm that presented, at the trade fair in Poznan, a small apparatus that made it possible to receive a television program from the Astra satellite. Teresa Janczak was not familiar with the firm, but she asked, "Why do you want to buy the equipment from the Germans? Our specialists can do it better!" "I don't know who to go to," said the man from the housing cooperative.

Ms. Janczak knew. She talked with well-known electronics specialists from the Communication Institute of the Warsaw Institute of Technology and National Research and Development Center for Common Use Electronic Equipment. After several hours she learned who could help her with what. All the people to whom she spoke expressed keen interest in the idea. So she organized numerous meetings with specialists from various fields. A variety of firms and institutions seized on the notion of building a cable television system linked to

satellite transmissions. Foreign firms were also interested. When everything was buttoned down, Teresa Janczak turned to one of the best specialists in communication; he recommended his teacher, engineer Grzegorz Wisniewski, currently technical director at TESA. On the advice of engineer Wisniewski, it was decided in the firm to set up the electronic mail system, more necessary to Polish businessmen, first. Implementation of other telecommunication options was postponed until a change in the Law on Telecommunication.

The TESA partnership was registered on 7 June 1990 with equity capital of 1.5 billion zloty [Z]. The foreign partner is the Austrian firm Prosystem-Queen of Saba. The largest domestic shareholder is PHZ Universal SA. Its president, Dariusz Przywieczerski, had a major part in establishing the firm.

The costs of setting electronic mail in motion are \$1.5 million and Z25 billion. The firm's president, Wojciech Majda, is convinced that given the great interest electronic mail has encountered, the money will be returned quickly. An advertising campaign conducted in October has already brought 15,000 applications. Both private and state firms are still applying. The first subscribers were entered into the computer on 5 November. The memory of the central computer of Poland's electronic mail has 25,000 subscribers.

The organizers and owners of Multicom promise that because of the speed of transmitting data, electronic mail is about 20 to 25 percent cheaper than sending information by fax or telex. Direct communication between two electronic mail subscribers is even cheaper. In time all costs are expected to decrease, which should eliminate telexes. That is what is happening in developed countries. Perhaps it will also happen in Poland.

ROMANIA

How Currency Might Become Convertible

91BA0252A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 10 Jan 91 p 3

[Article by Petru Tofan: "Suggestions for the Convertibility of the Leu"]

[Text] To obtain hard currency we have to spend hard currency! The rapid recovery of each economic factor will implicitly bring about the recovery and development of the entire national economy, and wage earners will feel encouraged to participate with all their talents not only in commodity production but also in the management of the production. Incentives to workers will lead to the production of a mass of commodities equal or even greater than the quantity of money in circulation. The inflation that is devastating all of the society's resources will be reduced. Currently, according to the government's report to Parliament, the quantity of money in circulation is one year ahead of the quantity of commodities available. This phenomenon also results in

serious consumer and industrial shortages, spiraling profiteering and corruption, alarming rise in unemployment, and the sinister specter of complete economic collapse. We need a production that will allow us to resume the chain of regular supplies among economic agencies, of commodities to fill store shelves, and then of products to export for hard currency. Before it is too late. We can restore the national economy by means of production levers. If they have the motivation of hard currency earnings in proportion to how much they produce in excess of the production program, clearly the plants will work as close as possible to the level of planned parameters, the labor force will stay in the country and will be increasingly well paid, and the marketing of the commodities obtained will indeed represent economic competition. Thus, we will have the conditions permitting extensive operation of the elements of a market economy. The available labor force will be drawn to production and service sectors offering salaries and shares in hard currency; conditions will be created for observing the correlation between output and salaries. The correlation between the quantity of money in circulation and the quantity of commodities in the market will also be amended. The achievement of a surplus of commodities, goods, and services in the market in relation to the quantity of money in circulation can create an ideal economic situation like in Sweden, the United States, Germany, etc. In other words, the gradual production of commodities for the existing money surplus, which in fact will ensure covering for the leu, will be the test for the achievement of a competitive market economy and the genesis of the seeds of gradual convertibility of the leu. This is how, by spending certain amounts of hard currency to pay salaries we can in a relatively short period of time—two or three years—achieve a convertible national currency. Consequently, let us spend hard currency to secure potential hard currency! Let us pay Romanians in hard currency so that they will produce hard currency in their own country.

What efforts would the national economy be required to make to implement this scenario for economic growth?

The government would have to first decide which are the priority, key sectors of the national economy in which to implement a system of partial pay in convertible currency. Naturally, this step must not be merely symbolic, but must incorporate if not all the sectors, then most of them. According to our data on the labor force structure according to branches, currently we could begin to pay salaries partially in hard currency to approximately four million employees. Given that the average salary in our country is approximately 3,200 lei, we would have to pay in hard currency salaries totaling approximately four billion lei a month, which makes about \$120 million a month, or \$1.5 billion a year. At first sight that seems a very big effort. But if we keep in mind the potential result we could obtain by carrying out this scenario, we believe that the effort is not too great. We must recall that currently none of the former socialist countries has

a convertible national currency, nor do they have any chance of making it convertible any time soon with the lukewarm therapies they are applying. Where do we get the hard currency to pay those salaries? Naturally, the first source would be the revenues obtained by the economic factors themselves from foreign trade activities. According to the present legislation, in 1990 the units received 30 percent of the hard currency earned, while as of 1991 they will have received 50 percent. As is known, under the socialist economy it was said that the working people were the owners, producers, and consumers. Those abstract ideas contributed nothing to the workers' living standard. That is precisely what justifies spending some of the economic factors' hard currency earnings on paying a percentage of salaries, i.e., on those who were instrumental to obtaining those earnings. Another source of hard currency can be foreign loans. We feel that it is perfectly justified to first of all take out this kind of foreign loan earmarked to pay Romanian workers, who will thus be stimulated to work for the recovery and growth of the national economy. The later such foreign loans are taken out, the more painful will be the "shots" required for the recovery of the national economy. Approving such loans can be a target of humanitarian aid from specialized bodies. The volume of such loans would not be excessively high because, after approximately one to two years of implementation of this economic recovery scenario, we would already have the means to partially finance hard currency salaries out of our own export earnings in the national economy.

As we secure increasingly large hard currency resources thanks to the development of the national economy, we can gradually increase the salary percentage paid in hard currency. The practice of the implementation of such a model of economic organization will in its turn highlight additional criteria for improvement.

A third source of hard currency earnings for the above purpose can be the sale of high value assets such as: apartments, production and service facilities, etc. This can help us achieve a fresh flow of hard currency to the state budget.

This kind of operations will decisively stimulate [workers] to work more in order to earn more. Inflation will be reduced because people will bring their money reserves into circulation. Naturally, the economic factors will have to establish internationally competitive production and quality norms, so that the commodities manufactured can guarantee the convertibility of the leu at any time and in any market. Thus, by spending certain amounts of hard currency as an incentive to workers we can find means of achieving a prosperous national economy with a convertible national currency.

'Timisoara' Trade Union Leader Interviewed

91BA0253A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
16 Jan 91 p 5

[Interview with Adrian Simon, leader of the "Timisoara" Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Timis County, by Florin Ciobanescu; place and date not given]

[Text] [Ciobanescu] If Muhammad doesn't go to the mountain, the mountain has to come to Timisoara. But why so late?

[Simon] First of all, it depends who views whom and how. As far as we are concerned, we know that if it hadn't been for Timisoara, nothing would have happened. We've said that before and so far no arguments have been found to the contrary. Why so late? This may indeed be our fault because we observed the six-month moratorium requested by the government, because as honest people we expected others, about whom we thought the same, to do their job and because we reacted only when the price liberalization into which the same government "plunged" us moved those who have no other source of livelihood but their work from a sort of apprehension about the future to genuine despair about the present.

[Ciobanescu] Why precisely now?

[Simon] Very simply because now even basic staples cannot be found in the stores. We don't have any more raw and other materials now. There is no motivation left to work. We don't have major economic laws to restructure enterprises. Because old structures continue to be preserved, old communists are being reactivated, the centralized economic system is firmer than ever, and the disinformation practiced by TVR [Romanian Television] and some of the press seems endless. Because the people truly guilty during the Revolution have still not been punished and the events of Tirgu Mures and those of 13-15 June in Bucharest have still not been cleared up. And on top of all that came the political interpretation of the commemoration of the Revolution in Timisoara and the current economic strikes.

Speaking for ourselves, any possible coincidences or simultaneous occurrences have nothing to do with us. Ask those responsible for the causes what they think. Note that on 8 November we addressed the government directly, but we still haven't received an answer.

[Ciobanescu] You were invited to direct negotiations, which you turned down.

[Simon] After the cup of dissatisfaction was full and spilled over in street demonstrations and strikes!

[Ciobanescu] Each one of the dialogue partners prefers to "play" on its home field. But isn't it possible that beyond legislative deficiencies or lapses that you criticize in the activities of the executive branch, a certain managerial incompetence may be hiding after all, an incompetence that takes refuge in dialog as a universal panacea?

[Simon] Some managers or chief engineers may also be responsible. But it is not the business of trade unions to make evaluations, primarily because they don't have hiring or firing authority. One thing I would like it to be clear to everyone. We demand solutions in principle that

can enable workers to produce as much as they know how, can, and want to. With earnings commensurate to their labor.

[Ciobanescu] Nevertheless, you discussed material allocations, orders, contracts, and so forth. Can it be that in such conditions, when the government gets to deciding out of what, how many, and for whom Victoria Guban, for example, should manufacture shoes, you return along the "democratic" path of dialogue to the same "centralism" that everyone claims to hate like the devil hates holy water?

[Simon] No. Although such a risk does exist since the state is still the only owner and the government continues to manage [plants] through its bureaucratic structures. Whether we like it or not, or rather we do but they don't, we come to the core of the question around which we turn like a dog chasing its own tail: economic autonomy, or whatever you want to call it, without so many political and administrative interpretations. The autonomy that is nothing but words in the absence of real privatization. If, in carrying out the special powers that it requested from Parliament to speed up the process of reform toward a market economy, the government had taken the privatization measures required to ensure real autonomy for enterprises, now there wouldn't have existed so many reasons for divorce even before the wedding took place. But the government didn't do it. That is why we demanded and have reason to demand: "Down with the government." The same goes for the president.

[Ciobanescu] But the Office of the Presidency does not have governing prerogatives.

[Simon] It doesn't. But directly or indirectly, at least morally it had an obligation to take a public attitude toward the events that occurred in Timisoara and throughout the country. Not by denigrating them. Before making any evaluation they owed Timisoara a "face to face" dialogue. Like between honest people who respect each other. No doubt in that case we would have realized who was wrong.

[Ciobanescu] And the conclusion?

[Simon] I can repeat what you heard me say at the concluding session on Saturday after six hours of stormy debates. We have 13 months of experience. There are too many questions people asked that we cannot answer. During the CPUN [Provisional National Unity Council]

period it was the same government that made mistakes. True? We think it was. Parliament is now discussing the Cojocaru, Rugina, etc. option. In other words, fixing the "electoral" mistake made after the Revolution, when social shares were given back so that we now have something to discuss in the future tense about shares and stock. The political, economic, and social problems we have in Timisoara are well known. It is the fault of geography. Because of it we know more and want more and faster. This may be insulting or annoying to others but that's how it is. The same thing goes for the resignation demands. Our problems have been known for months. We have been on strike for the past three weeks. Now, when massive foreign aid is arriving for the strikers and when people have been demonstrating in other cities, too, the government hastened to talk to us. And now it's trying to solve in 36 hours what it failed to solve over a whole year. Why did it come so late? Why does it want to solve everything so quickly?

[Ciobanescu] But did solutions come at least at the 25th hour?

[Simon] I can't tell as long as what was decided is nothing but a plan of measures in which everything is in the future tense. Anyway, it is all too much like the old commands of the party county committee who were drafting the same programs of measures that some activists or others were pursuing. On the other hand, if problems that couldn't be solved for a whole year could suddenly be solved in 36 hours, it becomes clear who the incompetents, or those who want to destabilize the country, are and why our demands for resignation and the general strike are totally justified.

[Ciobanescu] But is it really a general strike?

[Simon] Instead of an answer, note that at least 30 percent of production facilities are forced into a technological strike because of objective reasons: lack of raw materials or power and lack of orders or contracts. And the "organizers" of those strikes are the government, the ministries, and their departments who claim to be holding in their hands all the reins with which people struggle in factories. What are we supposed to do in such situations? Accept allocations of raw and other materials at the expense of other enterprises in the country?! That, too, is a diversion. They're trying to turn the entire country against us, as they did in the past, too. We can't agree to that. Nevertheless, we expect a governmental commission to come to Timisoara to discuss the social problems of the workers.

POLAND

Critical Look at Catholicism's Changing Role

91EP0229A Poznan WPROST in Polish No 50,
16 Dec 90 pp 16-17

[Article by Wieslaw Kot: "Polish Catholicism: Hypocrisy of Statistics; Church Stands Helpless Without Communist Bogeyman and Faced With an Ideological Free Market"]

[Excerpts] The 90-some-percent figure ascribed to Catholic Church membership in Poland has provoked speculation over the ratio. There is the simple principle of subtraction. If it is not possible to get drunk everyday and be a Catholic at the same time, then the church has 2 to 3 million fewer members. If a woman cannot have several abortions and be a Catholic, then the membership figures drop by at least another 100,000. Further, if it is not possible to evade work on a routine basis—the seventh deadly sin is sloth—and remain a Catholic, then...and so on. The thing is that all those who drink, have abortions, and do not work still consider themselves Catholics at the same time and are often ready to defend their faith tooth and nail. They do not reject alcohol, and they do not reject the church. After all, they do not consider it necessary, and neither does the church, but this situation is undoubtedly temporary, and in the new social and political situation Catholicism is going to have to answer the question of its identity.

The crisis of the great multitude which has filled the churches is inevitable on two counts. The crowd gave a sense of community and solidarity in opposition to totalitarian leadership. It gave a downcast nation a sense of power (just look at how many of us there are!). In addition, religion expressed in a crowd singing, marching, and praying together was cultivated as a model of popular piety. Meanwhile, as communism has come to an end, urban culture has taken on greater influence and models, and massive religious expression is losing its purpose. The church, shocked by the rapid decline of communism, was obviously ready for a longer war, because it had not prepared appropriate organizational formulas for expressing faith when there was no single clear adversary, let alone one that could be blamed for all our domestic failures. Thus, the Antiabortion Law and the introduction of religious instruction into the schools are acts of desperation and proof of the momentous fear that, given the ideological free market and the absence of the specter of communism, the church will become helpless and be defeated as a result. Moreover, if the church actually has so little influence over the practice of its followers that it cannot even keep them from killing—this is how it terms abortion—this fact is proof of serious defeat. So, either the church is much smaller than it claims and generally seems to be, or it has these millions of followers it claims to have, but its moral significance—not to be confused with its political authority!—is minimal and very ambiguous. [passage omitted]

A follower feels alienated from the parish to which he is affiliated, joining in annual caroling, and being registered in the parish office. The liturgy, especially the homily, is addressed to the ordinary listener and most often intoned in ecclesiastical newspeak or consists of general instruction, and as a rule it is not scholarly. The adult Pole's religious instruction is therefore a collection of ad hoc dogmatic information so imprecise that it often leaves people dumbfounded and leads them to express moral standards in words such as: "I don't consider that to be a sin."

At the same time there is competition in the form of Protestant faith communities. Their followers meet in small groups to pray and study the Bible. They know one another socially, help each other, and also see that moral standards are adhered to. So, if the Baptists, for example, consider smoking to be sinful, then they simply do not smoke. They do not deliberate over how to reconcile how to smoke and still not commit a sin. If the Jehovah's Witnesses consider alcohol to be evil, they simply do not drink. That is all there is to it. There are no exceptions to the rule, because a person who is an exception ceases to be a Jehovah's Witness.

Change in seminary education is needed for parish reorganization. It is difficult to pass judgment on organizational matters, but life itself will cause some changes to come about sooner or later. First, the model of the rural pastor who arrogantly instructs everyone and is not disposed to present arguments in support of his reasoning must be resisted and sooner or later replaced by a widely educated priest skilled in argumentation and reasoning. To this end the seminary curriculum needs to be expanded to include courses on the theory of mass communication and the study of culture. Regardless of his moral position, the priest should also be a proven specialist in his area, creating a sort of market of pastoral services. Another problem is that seminary education is not very open to current parish issues. The result is formation of pastoral personnel who resort to instruction that is as universal and noble as it is fruitless. The principal of moderate means should also be implemented. Materially, a priest should be neither better nor worse off than his average parishioner. A cleric's material situation should be related to a specific parish and controlled by it.

The idea that Polish Catholicism must prove itself would seem to be the only sensible, decent way for it to preserve its identity in a situation where the integrating force of communism has died out, but there is nothing to indicate that this self-validation is to be done. On the contrary, the church's political successes and the spirit of religious triumphalism, with its rich Polish traditions, cause the church to resort to administrative methods and edicts. The ineffectiveness and superficiality of these measures are actually delaying the renewal that is needed, but they are no replacement for it, and the results of this fact will probably appear more quickly than we think.

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